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ABSTRACT 
 
Reliable and detailed descriptions of the content and emotions associated 
with persecutory delusions have been emphasized as important for the 
foundation of effective theoretical development and clinical practice. Two 
studies have directly examined these associations in persecutory ideation 
(Green et al., 2006; Freeman et al., 2001), and found details of content to be 
associated with depression and anxiety.  
 
The aim of this study is to partially replicate and extend previous research by 
exploring possible associations between specific emotions and content. Six 
research hypotheses were examined. It is hypothesised that the details of 
content such as the power of the persecutor as rated by the participant would 
be associated with depression and anxiety, deservedness would be 
associated with anger and shame and the participants‟ ability to cope would 
be associated with shame and depression. 
 
Thirty-seven participants experiencing persecutory delusions were recruited 
from inpatient and outpatient locations within a specific NHS Trust. Five 
measures that assessed persecutory delusional content and emotional 
responses were completed.  This included a novel assessment tool 
developed for this study.  
 
Results of this study failed to support five of the six research hypotheses as 
no associations were found between content of persecutory delusions and 
specific emotions.  In fact, it was found that there was a slight trend of the 
relationship being in the opposite direction to that predicted. 
 
Findings of this study have a few implications for contemporary approaches 
to persecutory delusions.  It suggests that there are gaps in our 
understanding and examination of persecutory delusions.  Additionally it 
could mean that the theories of persecutory delusions which emphasize 
emotions should be revised.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION  
This thesis explores the precursors to, and the processes involved in the 
development of persecutory delusions; one of the most frequent and 
distressing symptoms of psychosis (Freeman, 2007). It is partially a 
replication of previous work regarding the role of emotion and content in 
persecutory delusions. In addition, there is a focus on extending the general 
understanding of the cognitive and emotional processes related to 
persecutory delusions, by broadening the range of emotions considered. To 
this end, a new scale was developed to capture th1e range of emotions to be 
explored. 
  
In order to develop the argument for further investigation in this area, this 
phenomenon needs to be considered within the wider context of delusions.  
First, the discussion will include a presentation of the general background to 
the study.  Commentary will include contemporary ways this phenomenon is 
examined and understood; the use of the singe symptom approach, a 
cognitive framework for psychosis, and a clear definition of persecutory 
delusions. Next, models of persecutory delusions are discussed. The model 
of Freeman et al. (2002) in particular, will be discussed in some depth as it is 
considered most pertinent to the foundation of this study.  The third section 
of this introduction will present six studies which provide empirical evidence 
most relevant to the background for this study, and justification for the 
development of the research hypotheses.  The aim and purpose of this study 
will then be presented. To help explore the research hypotheses, a new 
scale was developed. Therefore, the subsequent section is a discussion of 
assessment measures and the rationale for developing a new scale. Finally, 
the study‟s potential contribution to knowledge of persecutory delusions will 
be discussed. 
  
Relevant literature for this thesis was derived using word searches for 
„delusions‟ and „persecutory delusions‟ in the online Google search engine. 
The databases Psych Info (1980-2011) and Medline (1992-2011) were used 
to review relevant journal articles.   Additional reference lists were found from 
relevant journal articles. 
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1.1 .    General background to the study 
This section introduces a general discussion of delusions prior to considering 
the specific nature of the sub-type of persecutory delusions. 
 
Delusions are generally considered to be one of the main positive symptoms 
of psychosis, along with hallucinations, and, less commonly, disorganised 
thought and speech (American Psychiatric Association [DSM-IV-TR] 2000). 
The term „psychosis‟ in turn, refers to a collection of symptoms usually 
observed in the acute phase of several psychiatric disorders and conditions. 
They include schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, dementia, 
Parkinson‟s disease and multiple sclerosis (American Psychiatric Association 
[DSM-IV-TR] 2000). In addition, psychosis has also been observed in 
individuals experiencing an adverse drug reaction or extreme stress 
(American Psychiatric Association [DSM-IV-TR] 2000).  Persecutory 
delusions are the most common type of delusions, and are found in almost 
all of the above disorders (see Freeman, 2007, for a review). 
 
Empirical evidence has consistently suggested a biological component in the 
aetiology of psychosis which leads to aberrant perceptions and salience of 
stimuli (van der Gaag, 2006). The efficacy of anti-psychotic drugs such as 
clozapine in terms of helping to alleviate the symptoms of psychosis appears 
to give support to the use of the medical model as an explanation for this 
phenomenon. However, despite helpful intervention with medication, 
individuals often continue to experience residual psychotic symptoms and 
other concerns and disabilities associated with psychosis (Freeman & 
Garety, 2004). Over the last three decades, our understanding of psychosis 
has developed further due to a focus on the psychological aspects of 
psychotic experiences (Freeman, 2008).  
 
1.1.1.   Contemporary approaches to understanding psychosis 
Stress-vulnerability models generally agree that psychosis develops where 
there is a vulnerable predisposition of biological origin (Zubin & Spring, 
1977). Onset may follow life events, illicit drug abuse, periods of isolation and 
adverse environments. More contemporary models further stipulate that the 
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psychotic experience also includes emotional changes and disruptions in 
cognitive processes (Garety et al., 2001; 2005). Other recent contributions to 
our understanding of psychosis come from the proliferation of work using the 
single symptom approach and literature on the continuum model of 
psychosis. 
 
1.1.1.2.     Single symptom approach 
A general direction within mental health research has been the examination 
of experiences as individual symptoms rather than within a diagnostic 
categorisation (Freeman, Bentall & Garety, 2008). The advantages of this 
approach were initially noted by Persons (1986), and championed by Bentall 
(1990; 2001), among others. It is argued that this approach enables a 
detailed, fine-grained study of symptoms, recognises the continuity of clinical 
phenomena with normal phenomena, and avoids the misclassification of 
individuals that can occur when an unreliable or invalid classificatory system 
is used (Pearsons, 1986). In addition, knowledge gained by isolating key 
variables can help modify and improve the more general classification of 
psychosis.  In line with this framework, many psychosis researchers also 
advocate a single symptom approach towards delusions (Freeman, 2007; 
Bentall et al., 2001).  One consequence of such an approach to mental 
phenomena was the study of persecutory delusions, in relative isolation from 
other psychotic symptoms, as a phenomenon of interest.  In addition, using 
this approach, individuals with psychosis can be classified in terms of their 
current concerns, and treated accordingly, rather than being considered as a 
homogenous group (Allardyce, Suppes, & van Os, 2007). 
 
There are, however, some difficulties in adopting this approach in relation to 
delusions. One such difficulty is the frequent co-occurrence of symptoms 
such as hallucinations, grandiosity and delusions of reference (Johns et al., 
2004; Maric et al., 2004; Fowler, 2007).  Arguably, a focus on individual 
symptoms can overlook this confounding factor and this heterogeneity found 
in psychosis may lead to the assumption that underlying causes/processes 
are similar when they might not be.  However, this particular approach has 
brought the paranoid experience into greater focus (Freeman & Garety, 
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2000).  Researchers and/or clinicians have achieved greater clarity in 
deciding the elements that may be of interest, and some authors have 
argued that this approach has increased the understanding of persecutory 
thinking (Freeman, 2008).  This study adopts the single symptom approach 
as one of the starting points for investigation of the research hypotheses 
given the argument of helping achieving greater clarity for the phenomenon 
of interest, this instance being that of persecutory delusions. 
  
1.1.1.3.    Psychosis along a continuum 
Psychotic symptoms were traditionally considered as qualitatively distinct 
from normal experience. This was intrinsic to the definition for the 
phenomena and diagnosis (Jones et al., 2003).  However, current ways of 
understanding psychosis includes considering these experiences along a 
continuum (Claridge, 1994; van Os, 1999). One implication of this approach 
is that similar symptoms seen in patients with psychotic disorders, can be 
measured in non-clinical populations, and experiencing symptoms of 
psychosis is not inevitably associated with the presence of disorder (van Os 
et al., 2009). 
 
Results from a number of studies suggest a great overlap between the range 
of scores of hospitalised in-patients and individuals from the general 
population (Peters et al., 1999).  It has been found that individuals scoring 
highly on schizotypal questionnaires resemble schizophrenia patients on 
experimental correlates such as reasoning biases and information and 
language processing (Linney et al., 1998; Peters, Pickering & Hemsley, 
1994, Nunn & Peters, 2001). A conservative estimate of 10-15% of the 
general population regularly experience paranoid thoughts (Freeman et al., 
2005; Verdoux et al., 1998a; Olfson et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2004; Ostling 
& Skoog, 2002). 
 
A more recent systematic review of studies of population rates of subclinical 
psychotic experiences, revealed a median prevalence rate of approximately 
5% and a mean incidence rate of approximately 3% (van Os et al., 2009). In 
addition, with follow-up studies, the small difference between prevalence and 
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incidence rates indicate that approximately 75-90% of all psychotic 
experiences are transitory and disappear over time (van Os et al., 2009).   
This review implies that individuals experiencing symptoms of psychosis are 
in greater numbers than those which are included in the more constricted 
medical concept of schizophrenia (Peters et al., 1999). 
 
1.1.1.4.     Cognitive framework for psychosis 
Arguably, the most influential framework for examining psychotic symptoms 
has been the adoption of the cognitive approach.  Essentially, this approach 
provides a psychological description by focusing on mental processes and 
perceptions as a way of explaining and understanding mental distress 
(Garety et al., 2001).  Unlike the stress-vulnerability models, the cognitive 
approach places emphasis on the appraisal of unusual experiences. This 
appraisal is then argued to transform these experiences into psychotic 
symptoms (Garety et al., 2001).  
                                                                   
Specific psychological processes have been implicated in the formation and 
maintenance of psychotic experiences by contemporary cognitive 
researchers (Bentall et al., 2001; Garety et al., 2001; Garety, Freeman, 
Jolley, Dunn, Bebbington et al., 2005). These include theory of mind deficits, 
attributional biases and a „jumping to conclusions‟ style of thinking.  These 
cognitive processes bias the individual‟s search for explanations of their 
experiences, leading to fantastical conclusions (Freeman, 2007). In addition, 
they constrain and skew the content of such explanations. „Theory of mind‟ 
(the ability to understand the mental states of others, ToM) deficits in 
understanding social situations and intention of others, have been reported 
in individuals with psychosis (Frith, 1992; Corcoran et al., 1995, 2003). In 
relation to persecutory delusions, this may result in the individual finding it 
harder to read others' intentions towards him or herself. Combined with a 
hyper vigilance to threat, negative intent is conceived and the individual feels 
persecuted (Frith, 2004). Due to this deficit, the individual is thought to more 
easily conclude that he/she is being conspired against by others, as true 
intentions seem unfathomable (Frith 2004; Brune, 2005).  However, evidence 
for TOM deficits have been found to be associated more with other 
6 
 
symptoms of psychosis such as thought disorder and negative symptoms 
rather than persecutory delusions (Greig, Bryson & Bell, 2004). This 
suggests that this specific psychological process may not be part of the 
formulation and maintenance of persecutory delusions. It also strengthens 
the argument for the single symptom approach in considering persecutory 
delusions in relative isolation from other psychotic experiences. 
 
Evidence of bias has also been found in attribution style in individuals 
experiencing symptoms of persecutory delusions (Garety, Hemsley & 
Wessley, 1991; Bentall et al., 2001). A number of studies have found that 
persecutory delusions are associated with an attributional style, 
characterised by externalising the cause of negative events to other people 
specifically rather than to circumstances (Kinderman & Bentall 1996a 1996b; 
Bentall et al., 2001).  
 
„Jumping to conclusions‟ has been one of the most successfully replicated 
findings involving reasoning bias (Freeman, 2007). Empirical evidence has 
illustrated that a significant number of individuals experiencing delusions are 
hasty in their data gathering („jump to conclusions‟), in that they gather less 
evidence, which is hypothesized to lead to the rapid acceptance of beliefs, 
even if there is limited evidence to support them (Garety & Freeman, 1999; 
Garety et al., 2005; van Dael et al., 2006). However, it is important to note 
that this is a finding not based on delusional content and this evidence is not 
consistent for all sub-types of delusions; including persecutory delusions 
(Freeman, 2007). 
 
The above biases in cognitive processes have added to the theoretical 
understanding of the development of psychosis. They have also been 
incorporated to varying degrees within the different cognitive models of 
psychosis on which further study of persecutory delusions was based. 
 
1.1.1.4.1.    Cognitive models of psychosis 
Four general cognitive models have emerged as explanations for the 
development of psychotic experiences (Frith, 1987; Garety et al., 2001; 
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Hemsley, 1986; 1993, Morrison; 2001).  However, the cognitive framework 
provided by Garety et al., (2001), incorporates aspects of the other three 
models to provide a multi-factorial explanation of psychosis and, arguably, 
has gained dominance as the explanation for psychosis development.  
 The model for the positive symptoms of psychosis hypothesised by Garety 
et al., (2001) adheres to the general consensus that psychosis develops in 
individuals with a vulnerable predisposition (of bio psychological origin).  
Similar to the stress-vulnerability models, it is argued that onset often follows 
life events, adverse environments, illicit drug use or periods of isolation. 
However, there are additional emotional changes, and disruptions in 
cognitive processes of attention, perception and judgement. This leads to the 
most prominent symptoms of delusional beliefs and hallucinations (Garety et 
al., 2001) 
 
The model hypothesised by Garety et al. (2001) provides a useful model for 
understanding the development of positive symptoms of psychosis, as two 
possible proximal routes to development of the phenomenon were identified, 
clarifying particular processes.   Previous knowledge from the stress-
vulnerability models and the specific cognitive changes is integrated into the 
model, and contributes to the further expansion of knowledge regarding 
psychosis.  In addition, this model provides a foundation for at least one of 
the models of persecutory delusions (this will be discussed later in this 
introduction).   
 
It must be acknowledged that whilst the cognitive framework and models of 
psychosis have been greatly influential, and the dominant approach in 
contributing to knowledge in this area, it is not without limitations.   It could be 
argued that a cognitive approach is patient blaming with causes of distress 
located within the individual. Other aspects of psychosis are ignored, such as 
an individual‟s emotional response to the experience of psychosis as a major 
life event (Anthony, 1993; Gumley, White, & Power, 1999).  Furthermore, 
there is robust evidence of increased rates of psychosis being associated 
with social factors such as urban environments (Cougnard, Marcelis & Myin-
Germeys, 2007); lower socio-economic status and migrant status (Rutten, 
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van Os, Dominguez & Krabbendam, 2008).  Such aspects cannot be 
accounted for within the cognitive approach to psychosis 
 
1.1.1.5.   Emotion and Psychosis 
The cognitive model presented by Garety et al. (2001), highlights a role for 
emotion in the development of the psychotic experience. This is in line with 
one of the central ideas of the cognitive approach to psychosis, that beliefs 
are linked to emotions (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). Birchwood 
(2003) argues that emotional dysfunction is pervasive in non-affective 
psychosis and there is additional distress (fear, anger shame) attached to the 
experience of psychotic symptoms.  
 
 
Emotional disturbance has been consistently observed in the prodromal 
phase of psychosis. Some 60% to 80% of individuals in this phase are said 
to report symptoms of anxiety, depression and irritability in the two to four 
weeks prior to the appearance of positive symptoms (Broome et al., 2005a; 
2005b; Freeman and Garety, 2003; Yung & Mc Gorry, 1997).  Following the 
first episode of psychosis, more than half of patients report „post-psychotic 
depression‟ during a period which carries a high risk of suicide (Birchwood et 
al., 2003). When symptoms persist, depression has been traced to the 
perceived power of voices (Birchwood et al., 2000) and of persecutory 
delusions (Freeman et al., 2001).    
 
The cognitive model of psychosis by Garety et al. (2001), focuses on the 
emotion of anxiety and its contribution to psychosis.  It is argued that three 
processes traditionally associated with anxiety disorders (information 
processing biases, safety behaviours and meta-cognitive beliefs) are 
important in the development of psychosis. Anxiety triggers hallucinations 
and increases delusional thoughts which will drive a search for a meaning 
and understanding that is consistent with affect-associated beliefs (Garety et 
al., 2001).  
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1.1.2. Summary 
Arguably, contemporary ways of exploring psychotic experiences have 
adopted specific approaches to the phenomena.  The single symptom 
approach as a starting point has led to individual symptoms being examined 
in some depth and the development of individual theoretical models (as is 
the case for persecutory delusions which will be discussed further) and 
assessment tools. The perception of psychotic symptoms along a continuum 
has challenged previous thought of the psychotic experience being 
qualitatively distinct from normal experience.  Evidence has identified the 
phenomenon across the non-clinical population suggesting that clinical 
persecutory delusions are related to more every day persecutory thoughts. 
The cognitive framework has allowed for theoretical exploration of the 
possible mental processes involved in the psychotic experience and 
subsequent research. Current dominant cognitive theory and empirical 
evidence argue a case for, and support the role of multiple psychological 
cognitive processes in development of psychosis, and a central role for 
emotional factors. Despite the well documented limitations to the cognitive 
framework and single symptom approach, these ways of understanding the 
nature of psychosis, arguably, have become dominant starting points for 
further exploration and research of this area.  The following discussion 
follows this trend by focusing solely on psychological approaches to 
delusions within a cognitive framework, and to persecutory delusions 
specifically. 
 
1.2. Delusions  
1.2.1. Defining the experience 
A universal definition of delusions appears to be problematic, as there 
remains widespread inconsistency of definition in studies on delusions 
(Munro, 2008).  
 
Within a cognitive framework, general consensus concedes that modern 
attempts to gain some clarity of definition for delusions began with the works 
of German phenomenologists.  These include Bleuler (1911), Jaspers (1913) 
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and Kraepelin (1919). Jaspers in particular, made the distinction between 
„primary‟ and „secondary‟ delusions which has been extremely influential in 
psychiatry (Garety & Hemsley, 1994).  
  
Defining delusions was taken a step further by Mullen (1979), with the 
assertion that a delusion is an abnormal belief that is: 
1. Held with absolute conviction. 
2. Experienced as self-evident truths usually of great personal 
significance. 
3. Not amenable to reason or modifiable by experience. 
4. Fantastic in content or at best inherently unlikely. 
5. Not shared by those of a common social or cultural background. 
      [Mullen, 1979, p.36] 
 
This definition was disputed by Garety and Hemsley (1994), as it presents a 
number of difficulties.  They argued that one difficulty is the fact that people 
who experience delusions may not hold them with absolute conviction. An 
additional difficulty is that criteria have not been produced to assess the idea 
that delusions are not amenable to reason. 
 
In an attempt to further clarify a definition for delusions, Oltmanns (1988) 
focused on the multi-dimensional nature of the delusional experience. It is 
asserted that in assessing the presence of a delusion, one should consider a 
list of defining characteristics or dimensions. No one item is compulsory, 
however, in conjunction with other items on the list, this provides greater 
evidence for the presence of a delusion.  The list entails: 
 
1.  The balance of evidence for and against the belief is such that other 
people consider it completely incredible. 
2. The belief is not shared by others. 
3. The belief is held with firm conviction. The person‟s statements or 
behaviours are unresponsive to the presentation of evidence contrary 
to the belief. 
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4. The person is preoccupied with (emotionally committed to) the belief 
and finds it difficult to avoid thinking or talking about it. 
5. The belief involves personal reference, rather than unconventional 
religious, scientific or political conviction. 
6. The belief is a source of subjective distress or interferes with the 
person‟s occupational or social functioning. 
7. The person does not report subjective efforts to resist the belief (in 
contrast to patients with obsessional ideas.) 
       [Oltmanns, 1988, p.5] 
Empirical evidence appears to support the proposal of a multidimensional 
view and definition of delusions (Brett-Jones, Garety & Hemsley, 1987; 
Garety & Hemsley, 1994) and Harrow et al., (2004). However, the definition 
presented by The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(2000) (DSM-IV-TR) appears to be most utilised within mental health (Munro, 
2008). In this main psychiatric diagnostic categorisation, delusions are 
described as one of the „active-phase symptoms‟ of schizophrenia.  They are 
defined as: 
 
„Erroneous beliefs that usually involve a misinterpretation of 
perceptions and experiences. The distinction between a belief and a 
strongly held idea is sometimes difficult  to make and depends in part 
on the degree of conviction with which the belief is held despite  clear 
contradictory evidence regarding its veracity ‟ [DSM-IV-TR, p.299].  
 
This definition of delusions appears to have incorporated Jasper‟s definition 
of the concept. 
 
In addition to a definition of delusions, the DSM-IV-TR provides seven 
subtypes of delusional disorder: erotomanic, grandiose, jealous, persecutory, 
somatic, mixed and unspecified type with persecutory delusions; the latter 
being the most common (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). This categorization of delusions 
by content continues to be the most common method for considering 
delusions (Garety & Hemsley, 1994). However, it has been argued that 
psychiatric explanations of delusional formations are expressions of the 
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empiricist and rationalist paradigms upon which modern science is based 
(Gergen, 1985). The traditional psychiatric view of delusions has been 
questioned further within the last decade (Harper, 2004; Cromby & Harper, 
2005).  Experiences of paranoia have been said to be seen as simply 
irrational and false, a sign of pathology whose context and content are 
meaningless and there are grounds for rejecting each of these assumptions 
(Cromby & Harper, 2005). 
 
Whilst acknowledging an alternative framework for delusions, this study has 
adopted the positivist cognitive approach to delusions for several reasons: 
 
1) The cognitive approach has been productive theoretically in providing 
a solid overarching definition in which to consider delusions. 
2) It can be argued that more research and empirical evidence has been 
produced to support the cognitive framework to delusions as opposed 
to other approaches. 
3) This approach has been productive therapeutically in developing 
specific interventions such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) 
and its efficacy has been supported (Cormac et al., 2002: Kuipers et 
al., 1997; Tarrier et al., 1998; Wykes et al., 2008). 
   
1.2.2.    Delusions in the general population 
Delusions were generally thought to be qualitatively distinct from normal 
experience, and this distinction should be intrinsic to the definition (Jones et 
al., 2003).  However, there is evidence to suggest that delusions exist within 
the non- clinical, healthy population. The Gallup (1995) survey showed that 
„false‟ beliefs are common in the general UK population:  
 45% believed in telepathy. 
 45% believed in the ability to predict the future. 
 42% believed in hypnotism. 
 39% believed in life after death. 
 31% believed in Ghosts.  
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[Social surveys/ Gallup Ltd, 1995] 
Peters, Joseph and Garety (1999) using the Peters Delusions Inventory 
(PDI, Peters et al., 1999), a questionnaire designed to measure delusional 
ideation in the general population, found that there was great overlap 
between the range of scores of those in a group with delusions and those 
from the general population. Freeman and Garety (2003) in their review of 
the rationale for separating neurosis and psychosis contend that empirical 
evidence is not consistent with the view that psychosis is qualitatively 
different from normal experience. To extend this further, Freeman (2006) 
performed a review of 15 studies and concluded that there is clear evidence 
for the existence of delusions within the general population. It is further 
stated that approximately 1-3% of the non-clinical population experience 
delusions of a level of severity comparable to clinical cases of psychosis. A 
further 5-6% of the non -clinical population  experience delusions of less 
severity. 
 
 A large epidemiological Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence 
Study (NEMESIS), found that 0.21% of the sample of non- clinical 
participants received a DSM-II-R diagnosis of non- affective psychosis (van 
Os et al., 2000).  A greater proportion (3.3%) had a psychiatrist-rated 
delusion.  Further evidence appeared to demonstrate that delusional 
thoughts are not distinct or occur solely within the clinical population but lie 
on a continuum (van Os et al., 2009). The above evidence appears to 
question a definition for delusions which incorporates the idea of being 
qualitatively distinct from the general population.  
 
1.2.3.    Defining persecutory delusions 
As the single symptom approach was generally adopted by researchers of 
psychosis, persecutory delusions appeared to be identified as an important 
phenomenon for study (Freeman, 2008). Arguably, several factors led to this 
research focus. First, persecutory delusions are particularly clinically 
relevant. They are the most likely delusion to be acted upon (Wessely et al., 
1993), and the presence of a persecutory delusion is a predictor of 
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admission to hospital (Castle, Phelan, Wessely & Murray, 1994). Secondly, 
they are one of the most frequently occurring delusions (Cutting, 1997). For 
instance, Sartorius et al. (1986), provided evidence demonstrating that 50% 
of individuals with signs of schizophrenia making first contact with services 
experienced persecutory delusions or paranoia, and that this was the most 
common symptom. Third, persecutory delusions have been identified as co-
occurring in 15% of cases of depression, 28% of cases of bipolar disorder, 
and in 30% of cases of post traumatic stress disorder (Butler et al., 1996; 
Goodwin & Jamison, 1990; Johnson, Horwath & Weissman, 1991; Hamner, 
Freuch, Ulmer & Arana, 1999). Furthermore, approximately 1–3% of the non-
clinical population have been found to have persecutory delusions of a 
severity comparable to clinical cases. A further 5–6% of the non-clinical 
population have a delusion of less severity and 10-15% has some degree of 
paranoid thinking (Freeman, 2006). 
 
Despite many previous attempts at defining delusions in general, none were 
made to define the persecutory sub-type (Freeman & Garety, 2000). There 
was the suggestion that early texts on schizophrenia and delusional beliefs, 
contain descriptions of persecutory delusions encountered in practice rather 
than detailed definitions, and were not specific to persecutory delusions 
(Freeman & Garety, 2000). Consequently, a detailed definition/set of criteria 
was developed by Freeman and Garety (2000). This definition uses the 
perception of persecutory delusions as threat beliefs/ anticipation of danger 
which is later made explicit in the Freeman et al. (2002) model of persecutory 
delusions. This definition is as follows: 
 
Criteria A:  The individual believes that harm is occurring, or is 
going to occur, to him or her 
Criteria B:  The individual believes that the persecutor has the 
intention to cause harm 
 
A number of points are further clarified: 
1. Harm concerns any action that leads to the individual experiencing  
    distress 
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2. Harm only to friends or relatives does not count as a persecutory belief,    
    unless the persecutor also intends this to have a negative effect upon the     
    individual 
3. The individual must believe that the persecutor at present or in the future    
     will attempt to harm him or her 
4. Delusions of reference do not count within the category of persecutory    
    beliefs 
Evidence for the validity of these criteria has been supported by the study of 
Startup et al. (2003). Consensualized ratings indicated that all participants of 
this study met Freeman and Garety‟s (2000) requirements for the existence 
of a persecutory belief. 
 
1.2.4.   Summary 
In the past two decades, delusions and persecutory delusions have been 
explored and revisions have occurred in terms of what makes the definition 
for these phenomena meaningful and reliable (Freeman, 2008).  Freeman 
and Garety‟s (2000) definition provides a solid, clear starting point for any 
research into this area. It provides a clear focus on „harm‟ as an important 
factor in helping to distinguish persecutory ideation from other thoughts.  This 
definition also incorporates the general definition provided by Mullen (1979). 
For example, an individual‟s belief that they will come to harm could be held 
with absolute conviction or not be amenable to reason or modified by 
experience. Given this clarity, this definition for persecutory delusions is 
adopted as a starting point for this study, within a cognitive model of 
persecutory delusions. 
 
1.3.    Models of persecutory delusions 
As a foundation to this study, it is important to discuss the current theoretical 
understanding of persecutory delusions. Three cognitive models have been 
developed as possible explanations for the origins of persecutory delusions. 
The models focus on differing processes and emotions to varying degrees. 
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1.3.1.    Persecutory delusions as psychological self defence 
Persecutory delusions are perceived as a form of psychological self defence 
by Bentall and colleagues (Bentall et al., 1994; 2001; 2008).  Individuals 
experiencing persecutory delusions are proposed to avoid the activation of 
negative self beliefs by making externalising, personalising attribution for 
negative events (Bentall et al., 1994).  Through the external-personalising 
attributions, individuals with persecutory delusions maintain a positive view of 
themselves, by effectively projecting their latent negative self-representation 
on others. The cost of maintaining self esteem in this way, however, is that 
such individuals must live in a subjective world that is peopled with hostile 
beings (Mc Kay et al., 2005). 
 
1.3.2.     „Poor -me‟, „bad-me‟ paranoia 
Researchers have studied further the relationship between self-esteem and 
persecutory delusions. Persecutory delusions are divided into two sub-types 
(„poor -me‟ and „bad -me‟ paranoia) by Trower and Chadwick (1995).  When 
„poor-me‟ (PM) paranoia is experienced, the individual believes persecution 
is unfair and unjustified.   It is hypothesised that „poor-me‟ paranoia is due to 
neglectful caregivers and insecurity threats to self-construction, leading to 
higher self-esteem, lower depression and anxiety. They are likely to exhibit 
anger and aggression. The second sub-type „bad –me‟ (BM) paranoia, refers 
to individuals who believe themselves to be in some way deserving of 
persecution.  „Bad-me‟ is proposed to stem from over-intrusive relationships 
with care givers and alienation threats to self-construction in their early 
years, resulting in a clinical presentation characterized by depression, 
anxiety and low self-esteem. Evidence has provided support for patients with 
PM paranoia being distinguishable from patients with BM paranoia in terms 
of clinical presentation (Chadwick et al., 2005). 
 
1.3.3.     Multi-factorial model  
The cognitive multi-factorial model of persecutory delusions developed by 
Freeman et al. (2001; 2002), is similar to the general cognitive model of 
psychosis developed by Garety et al. (2001), as it presents similar underlying 
processes and pathways to the development to persecutory delusions. 
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Rather than view persecutory delusions as a psychological defence against 
underlying negative emotion and low self-esteem, as argued by Bentall and 
colleagues, Freeman and colleagues (2001; 2002) argue that psychological 
delusions reflect the emotional state of the individual.   This model‟s inclusion 
of emotion in both the onset and maintenance of persecutory beliefs also 
sets it apart from the approaches provided by Bentall et al. (2001) and 
Trower and Chadwick (1995).   
  
Similar to the general cognitive model (Garety et al., 2001); the appraisal 
process of anomalous experiences is central to this theoretical framework.   
Within this model, it is hypothesized  that persecutory delusions begin with a 
precipitant (trigger), which may include major life events, ongoing stress, 
sleep disturbance, trauma or abuse of drugs (See figure 1; taken from 
Freeman, 2008).  For individuals with a vulnerability to psychosis, this trigger 
will „initiate inner-outer confusion‟ causing unusual experiences. As with the 
general cognitive model, it is proposed that the unusual experiences may 
result from the types of psychological dysfunction described by Hemsley 
(1986; 1993) and Frith (1987).  
 
The generation of unusual experiences by the trigger is proposed to possibly 
occur via three routes. The precipitant may trigger anomalies directly or 
through cognitive biases associated with psychosis, such as jumping to 
conclusions.  The third route is of importance and relevance to this study. It 
is proposed that triggering anomalies is through emotional disturbance. 
Emotion, in particular high levels of anxiety, is seen as the „key‟ in generating 
persecutory ideation as; 
 „The theme of anxiety is the anticipation of danger and it is the origin 
of the threat content in persecutory ideation‟.  [Freeman et al., 2008, 
p.131] 
Evidence from previous studies is used to support the idea that levels of 
anxiety are high many years before the development of psychosis, during the 
prodrome and subsequently (Jones et al., 1994; Tien & Eaton, 1992; Cosoff 
& Hafner, 1998; Norman & Malla, 1994). It is argued that:  
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„Such consistent findings of high levels of emotional distress 
throughout the course of delusions and hallucinations support the 
hypothesis that emotion has a direct contributory role to positive 
symptom development‟ (Freeman, 2002, p.14).  
 
In addition to the unusual experiences, cognitive biases and emotional 
disturbances, external events that are unusual, ambiguous, negative or 
neutral may also become incorporated into the search for a meaning for the 
triggering event. The search for a meaning is also mediated by pre-existing 
beliefs regarding the self, others and the world. Freeman et al., (2002) 
propose that a persecutory belief is likely to be formed if there are pre-
existing beliefs regarding vulnerability or if it is considered that harm is 
deserved because of previous behaviour or people and the world are 
perceived as hostile and threatening.   
 
An explanation for the triggering event will be formed from the internal 
events, external events, cognitive biases and pre-existing beliefs.  However, 
it is proposed by Freeman et al. (2002) that the explanation chosen will be 
further mediated by at least three other factors.  The first considers an 
individual‟s belief regarding mental illness and „madness‟.  It is argued that a 
persecutory belief is likely to be chosen as an explanation for unusual 
experiences, as this may be less distressing for the individual than believing  
that this is due to psychological processes internal to the self and that he/she 
is „mad‟.  Secondly, social factors are considered whereby an isolated 
individual, who is unable to revise his thoughts with others, is more likely to 
develop thoughts of threat. Finally, the anxious persecutory belief is more 
likely to develop if a person has a poor capacity to develop alternatives. 
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Fig.1.   Outline of factors involved in persecutory delusions development. 
(Replicated in this thesis with permission, Freeman, 2008) 
 
1.3.4.    Summary 
The development of three models for persecutory delusions highlights the 
recent interest in persecutory delusions. All three models emphasize the 
importance of considering the contribution of emotion to the content and the 
distress associated with the delusion (Green et al., 2006).   
 
The model of Freeman et al. (2002) differs from those of Bentall et al. (2001) 
and Trower and Chadwick, (1995) in one aspect which is important to this 
study. There are direct links between emotion and the content of delusions 
within the model of Freeman et al. (2002). The focus on the direct role of 
emotion in both the onset and maintenance of persecutory beliefs sets it 
    Emotion          
Anxiety.  Beliefs 
about self, others 
and the world formed 
in upbringing and 
subsequent 
experiences 
 Internal and external events           
Internal: arousal, anomalous 
experiences, core cognitive 
dysfunction.                                            
External: Discrepant, negative, socially 
significant, or ambiguous events. 
     Reasoning             
Jumping to conclusions, 
confirmation bias, 
failure to consider 
alternatives 
        Search for meaning                        
Search for understanding/meaning, 
worry and ruminating. Not wanting 
to talk to others/ having nobody to 
provide feedback on ideas. 
                   Precipitant                              
Major life events, ongoing stress, sleep 
disturbance, trauma, drug taking                        
The Persecutory                         
(Threat) Belief 
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apart from the approaches provided by Bentall et al. (2001) and Trower and 
Chadwick (1995). 
 
Emotion is implicated directly in Freeman et al.„s (2002) model, in having a 
contributory role to positive symptom development, unlike the models of 
Bentall and Trower and Chadwick, where emotion is involved indirectly as 
being a consequence of self defence. It is argued that delusions are threat 
beliefs which are consistent with existing ideas about the self, others and the 
world.  Freeman et al.‟s (2002) model has a different emotion (anxiety) as 
primary focus for the development of persecutory delusions from Bentall‟s, 
which is based around depression/low self-esteem.   
 
One of the major limitations of Freeman et al.‟s (2002) model, lies in giving 
anxiety a primary role, both in the development and maintenance of 
persecutory delusions, the possible roles of other emotions in the 
development of persecutions have been somewhat overlooked.  However, in 
light of its emphasis on emotion playing a central role in the development 
and maintenance of delusions, the theoretical foundation for this current 
research study will draw on the approach of Freeman et al. (2001; 2002). 
 
1.4.  Empirical background to the study 
Prior to the early 1990s, the empirical study of delusional content had been 
relatively neglected (Boyle, 1992). Examples of the studies which existed 
prior to this time include the works of Chakraborty (1964); Lucas, Sainsbury 
and Collins (1962); Stompe et al. (1999); and Tateyama et al. (1989). These 
studies‟ discussion was limited to looking at the type of persecutor and the 
nature of the threat (Green et al., 2006). However, since the publication of 
these studies, the content of persecutory delusions has received renewed 
attention.  
 
The importance of reliable and detailed descriptions of content (such as 
beliefs about the power of the persecutor, deservedness, control and ability 
to cope) has been emphasized by Freeman and Garety (2000) and 
Freeman, Garety and Kuipers, (2001), as a foundation for effective 
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theoretical development and clinical practice.  This reasoning appears to 
have been echoed in part by the study of Aschebrock et al. (2003), in an 
international survey of mental health practitioners and researchers, exploring 
the level of interest in the content of delusions and hallucinations.   It was felt 
that an examination of content would increase understanding of clients‟ 
difficulties, improved in the nature of the therapeutic relationship and 
enhanced ability to assess risk and/or address safety issues.  
 
Arguably, considerable research has been carried out within the complex 
area of persecutory delusions.  However, to date, only two studies, that of 
Green et al. (2006) and Freeman et al. (2001), have focused on this area 
and considered directly the possible links between content and emotion 
within persecutory delusions.  This is the area of interest to this current study 
and it bears importance and relevance to discuss these studies in some 
detail. In addition, four further studies (Green, 2006; Fornells-Ambrojo & 
Garety, 2009; Miller & Mason, 2005 and Ritsner et al., 2003) that explore 
emotions in association with psychosis or schizophrenia provide some 
evidence indirectly relevant to this study and will be presented. 
 
1.4.1.    Content and affect in persecutory delusions 
 The Green et al., (2006) study is of particular importance since its aim was 
to explore the content of persecutory delusions and potential links with levels 
of affective disturbance. It was hypothesised, in line with the cognitive model 
of Freeman et al. (2002), that: 
  
1.  Individuals‟ beliefs regarding their persecutors and whether harm 
was derserved would be associated with increased depression and 
reduced self esteem. 
2. Aspects of content relating to appraisals of threat, specifically more 
imminent and more pervasive threat, would be related to anxiety. 
3. Less favourable and more self-diminishing content (beliefs which 
make individuals feel worse about them) would be linked with 
reduced self-esteem. 
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A cross-sectional investigation of 70 individuals with current persecutory 
delusions was conducted and a detailed description of persecutory content 
was made. Standardised measures were employed in addition to conducting 
interviews.  These included Beck‟s Depression Inventory (BDI-II, Beck, 
Steer, & Garbin, 1988b), Beck‟s Anxiety Inventory (BAI, Beck, Epstein, 
Brown & Steer, 1988a), Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) 
and the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS, Haddock et al., 
1999). 
 
Findings indicated that depression was positively, and self-esteem inversely, 
correlated with ratings of beliefs in the persecutor‟s power. The power 
differences between persecutor and the participant also correlated 
significantly with depression. Higher depression scores were also noted for 
participants who believed their persecution was deserved compared to those 
who did not. Self-diminishing beliefs were related to lower self-esteem, and 
to greater depression and delusional distress, but not to greater anxiety. 
Surprisingly, there was no evidence to suggest that appraisals of threat as 
imminent and pervasive were related to higher anxiety. 
  
In terms of limitations, causal relationships could not be determined by the 
correlational data of this study. Secondly, in basing the study on 
transcriptions of pre audio taped interviews baseline assessments, it was 
impossible to gather more detail on content than what had been provided. In 
spite of the limitations, this study provided direct empirical evidence, 
highlighting the importance of content and the association with emotions. 
 
1.4.2.   Developing the understanding of belief maintenance and emotional 
distress 
Freeman et al.‟s (2001) study first made explicit the conceptualisation of 
persecutory delusions as threat beliefs that share with anxiety disorders a 
theme of „anticipation of danger‟.  Using a cross sectional investigation this 
study assessed 25 individuals experiencing persecutory delusions for the 
belief content and emotional distress.  It was hypothesised that depression 
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and anxiety would be linked with the power of the persecutor. Four aspects 
of content were explored: the power of the persecutor, whether persecution 
was deserved, participants‟ perceived control over the situation and how well 
would they cope should the threat occur.  This information was gathered 
using the Details of Threat (DoT) questionnaire developed for the study.  
Standardised emotional disorders measures were utilised.  They included the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988b) and the 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI), (Beck, Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988a). 
 
Evidence from this study suggested that various aspects of content were 
associated with levels of depression, self-esteem and anxiety.  Higher levels 
of depression were associated with the belief that persecution was deserved. 
Individuals who thought that harm was deserved also showed lower self 
esteem. 
 
This study also provided evidence for the hypothesis that anxiety is 
associated with aspects of the appraisal of the threat; in particular, if the 
threat was judged to be more imminent, more pervasive, with no likelihood of 
rescue, then higher levels of anxiety were expected. Findings confirmed that 
the more pervasive the threat, the higher the anxiety. The presence of 
perceived rescue resulted in lower levels of anxiety (Freeman et al., 2001). In 
addition, results indicated that higher levels of delusional distress were 
associated with higher ratings of the awfulness of the threat, and that there 
was a correlation between imminent harm and delusional distress.  
 
The studies of Green et al. (2006) and Freeman et al. (2001) have 
contributed to the area of persecutory delusions by examining an area 
where, arguably, there was a gap in knowledge.  The importance of content, 
as stated by Freeman and Garety (2000), was explored in association with 
emotions. The two studies examined directly the associations between 
content of persecutory delusions and emotions, and have provided important 
information on the details of content and associated emotion.  Using the 
framework of Freeman et al. (2001; 2002), which places emphasis on the 
role of anxiety, the focus of examination by Green et al. (2006) and Freeman 
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et al. (2001) has been on the role of anxiety and depression in relation to the 
details of persecutory delusions; other emotions were not considered. The 
following studies have considered the possible role of alternative emotions 
linked with other aspects of paranoia or the wider diagnostic category. 
 
1.4.3.    Additional studies 
The study of Fornells-Ambrojo and Garety (2009), investigated attributions 
and emotions, in a sample of people with early psychosis experiencing 
persecutory delusions. The starting point for this study was Trower and 
Chadwick‟s (1995) theory of two types of paranoia („poor-me‟ and „bad-me‟, 
as described earlier in this introduction). The emotion of anger was the focus 
of research. It was hypothesised that anger is the key emotion in „poor- me‟ 
paranoia because of the belief that the persecution is deserved.   
 
It was found that the „poor-me‟ paranoia group showed higher levels of 
anger, anxiety and depression than the non-clinical control group.  Despite 
the focus of  study being on attributional bias and not delusional content in 
relation to anger, it is of relevance to this study in highlighting that emotions 
other than anxiety or depression could also be relevant to persecutory 
delusions. 
 
The study of Green (2006) also explored attributional style in relation to 
paranoia and anger. It was hypothesised that higher levels of anger would be 
associated with higher levels of trait paranoia, particularly ideas of 
persecution. As predicted, it was found that dimensions of anger were 
associated with high trait paranoia across the measures. 
 
In terms of limitations, this study may not have been epidemiologically 
representative, as it consisted mainly of students with higher levels of 
education. Secondly, the analysis involved multiple comparisons, thus, 
increasing the probability of chance findings. Results should, therefore, be 
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, this study has provided further 
evidence to suggest that emotions such as anger may feature more 
prominently in persecutory delusions.  
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The study of Miller and Mason (2005) explored feelings of shame and guilt in 
71 patients in the first episode of schizophrenia (considered the first five 
years of illness in this study).  It was reported that feelings of shame and guilt 
were common, which often persisted despite successful treatment of 
psychotic symptoms. However, emotions were considered within the 
diagnostic category of schizophrenia rather than considering the individual 
symptoms and did not comment on shame and guilt for persecutory 
delusions. This current study differs from the study of Miller and Masson 
(2005) in two important ways. First, this study is interested specifically in the 
possible contributions of shame and guilt to the sub type of persecutory 
delusions.  In adopting the single symptom approach rather than the 
diagnostic category like the study of Miller and Mason (2005), more clarity 
will be gained for exploring the research hypotheses. Secondly, this study 
differs in the methodology utilised. Their study was based on observations 
from direct clinical practice with no quantitative date taken from the patient.  
This study is quantitative in methodology, obtaining data from directly 
interviewing participants. 
 
There has been a prolific amount of literature in various areas, within and 
outside mental health, documenting the association between individuals‟ 
ability to cope and depression.  One study was found to directly explore an 
individual‟s ability to cope in relation to schizophrenia. Ritsner et al. (2003) 
argued the importance of the aspect of „coping‟ with symptoms as a predictor 
of levels of distress and general quality of life. This study examined the 
quality of life and coping with schizophrenia symptoms with 161 hospitalised 
patients with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective and mood 
disorders. It was found that the ability to cope accounted for 25% of the 
variance in quality of life scores, compared with 15% for psychological 
distress and 3% for general psychopathological symptoms.  It was concluded 
that the ability to cope with symptoms and associated distress substantially 
contributed to quality of life appraisal in schizophrenia.  Arguably, this study 
highlighted the importance of the participants‟ perception of the ability to 
cope in relation to their quality of life. However, this study did not consider 
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the symptoms of schizophrenia individually but rather as a diagnostic 
category.  
  
1.4.4.    General summary 
To summarise, the single symptom and cognitive approaches have shown to 
be useful frameworks acting as a foundation and catalyst for generating large 
amount of discussion and research on delusions and, more specifically, the 
subtype persecutory delusions. Cognitive models have emphasized the 
centrality of appraisals, and the importance of considering the role of 
emotions, in the development and maintenance of persecutory delusions.   
 
The studies exploring the associations between content (such as appraisals 
about the threat) and emotions have provided somewhat inconsistent 
evidence.  For example, the study of Freeman et al., (2001) found there was 
a weak trend for higher evaluation of the power of the persecutor to be 
associated with high levels of depression. However, the study of Green et al., 
(2006) found a significant correlation in that respondents who felt more 
powerful in the face of persecution had lower scores on the BDI. Anxiety has 
been implicated as the primary emotion associated with thought content in 
persecutory delusions (Freeman, 2007). However evidence for this 
association in the freeman et al. (2001) study was weak. In addition, the 
study of Green et al., (2006), found no evidence of thought content in 
persecutory delusions related to higher anxiety.  This inconsistent support for 
the associations between appraisals of content and emotions suggests that a 
replication of particular studies is warranted.  
 
Studies such as that of Fornells-Ambrojo and Garety (2009), Green (2006), 
Miller and Mason (2005) and Ritsner et al. (2003) did not explore investigate 
the role of emotions with reference to the content of persecutory delusions.  
However, they do suggest that further exploration of the role of other 
emotions apart from anxiety and depression such as anger and shame is 
warranted with reference to persecutory delusions.  It is clear that, in clinical 
presentation, individuals exhibiting symptoms of persecutory delusions 
experience a range of emotions, in addition to depression and anxiety, which 
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include anger and shame. This is potentially related to the perceived 
deservedness of their experiences and their ability to cope with the 
experiences. Although the Trower and Chadwick (1995) self defence theory 
alludes to this shame with the „bad- me‟ sub type of paranoia, no study has 
explored the possible links that the emotions of shame and guilt may 
 have with the content of threat beliefs.  An extension of studies is, thus, also 
warranted to explore further the emotions which have not been examined in 
depth with reference to persecutory delusions. Furthermore, given the 
seeming importance of the ability to cope with symptoms of schizophrenia to 
the individual‟s overall quality of life (as reported by the Ritsner et al., 2003, 
study), it was felt important to extend the examination of this aspect, and 
consider any relationship with the individual symptom of persecutory 
delusions. Additionally, it was felt important to consider associations between 
the individual‟s ability to cope with the threat belief with emotions as this may 
impact the individual‟s overall quality of life. 
  
1.5.   Aim and purpose of the study 
The main aim of this study was to replicate and extend previous findings in 
the area of persecutory delusions, examining in greater detail the possible 
direct associations between the content of persecutory delusions and 
particular emotions.  Previous studies have focused on the associations 
between delusions and the specific emotions of anxiety and depression. In 
addition to anxiety and depression, this study explores the possible 
associations of other emotions, namely anger, shame and guilt considering a 
multi-emotional contribution to the development of persecutory delusions. 
 
Steps were taken to ensure that this area of persecutory delusions and the 
research hypotheses had not been explored previously by other researchers. 
Specialist clinical psychologists within the area of persecutory delusions who 
have published within the last five years were consulted. Sources of 
information were gathered and reviewed from electronic sources (see 
References) 
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Freeman‟s theory of delusions, which includes a prominent role for anxiety , 
is the point of departure for discussing the role of other emotions in this 
study. Freeman‟s theory highlights anxiety as the anticipation of danger as 
the origin of the individual‟s threat belief arising from precipitants such as 
major life events, ongoing stress, sleep disturbance, trauma and drug taking. 
In addition to anxiety, the emotion anger in the sense of having been 
offended, wronged or denied may also be a key contributor to the 
development of the threat belief. This may arise from precipitants based on 
past experiences, not of significant life events but continuous experiences of 
feeling wronged such as feeling discriminated against or experiencing 
racism.  In addition to reasoning biases, anger could lead to a search for a 
meaning external to the self and persecutory threat belief.  
 
Depression has been explored as a possible emotion resulting from threat 
beliefs. The feelings of shame and guilt may also be a similar consequence 
of threat beliefs. Although Trower and Chadwick (1995) poor me/ bad me 
paranoia theory alludes to shame with the bad-me sub type of paranoia, no 
study has explored the possible links the emotions of shame and guilt may 
have with the content of threat beliefs. This study explores these possible 
links. This study‟s focus is also different from Trower and Chadwick‟s (1995) 
approach to paranoia and the relationship of thought content to affect.  A  
distinction is made between poor me/bad me paranoia. However, similar to 
Freeman‟s (2002) hypotheses, there is one primary emotion linked to thought 
content. This study‟s focus is based on the hypotheses that a range of 
emotions are linked to thought content in persecutory delusions. 
 
1.5.1.   Research questions and hypotheses 
The main research question was: 
What are the specific relationships between different aspects of content of 
delusions and specific emotions? 
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1.5.2.    Hypotheses 
Replication  
This study considered previous hypotheses the regarding the power of the 
persecutor and depression/ anxiety (Freeman et al., 2001; Green et al., 
2006). Based on the findings of Freeman et al. (2001) and Green et al. 
(2006) and the theoretical model of Freeman et al. (2002), two replication 
hypotheses are presented: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The power of the persecutor will be positively correlated with   
                        depression.  
   
Hypothesis 2:  The power of the persecutor will be positively correlated with  
                       anxiety. 
 
Extension 
This study explored further the role of anger and shame, and their possible 
associations with specific appraisals in persecutory delusions.  This study 
also explored the ability to cope with threat beliefs and possible associations 
with depression and shame in relation to persecutory delusions. In light of 
the findings of Green (2006) and Trower and Chadwick's (1995) „poor me‟, 
„bad me‟ subtypes, and based on clinical observations, the following 
hypotheses were tested: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Deservedness of threat will be inversely correlated with anger. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Deservedness of threat will be positively correlated with  
                       shame. 
 
 
In light of the findings of the Miller and Mason (2005) and Ritsner et al.‟s 
(2003), studies, the following hypotheses were tested: 
 
Hypothesis 5:  The ability to cope will be negatively correlated with shame 
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Hypothesis 6: The ability to cope will be negatively correlated with  
                      depression. 
To help explore the research hypotheses of this study, a new measure was 
developed to assess emotions associated with persecutory delusions. 
Therefore, it is important and relevant to discuss the assessment of 
persecutory delusions and the justification of a new measure. 
 
 
1.6.     Assessing persecutory delusions  
It has been argued that assessing persecutory ideation is not without its 
challenges and some of these have been addressed by Freeman et al. 
(2008).   One challenge is that one cannot rule out the possibility that a 
thought is realistic rather than paranoid, and that suspicions are justified. This 
is a particular concern for self report assessments since they can rely only on 
a judgement based upon the content of the belief, the evidence given and the 
context. In addition, it is stated that assessment of paranoia by self report 
questionnaires will overestimate the presence of unfounded paranoid thinking 
(Freeman et al., 2008)  However, despite these challenges, evidence 
suggests self-report positive symptom measure scores are correlated with 
those from interviewer assessments (Preston & Harrison 2003; Liraud et al., 
2004; Watson et al., 2006). In addition, self-report measures of paranoid 
thinking have been found to be associated with the occurrence of unfounded 
paranoid thinking in experimental conditions (Freeman et al., 2005a, 2005b 
2008; Valmaggia et al., 2007). This evidence suggests that self report 
measures are reliable and can be useful tools for gathering data with 
reference to persecutory delusions. 
  
1.6.1.   Assessment measures for delusions and persecutory delusions 
Various measures have been designed by researchers to capture differing 
aspects of delusions. General psychiatric one-dimensional measures such as 
the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay, 1991), the Brief 
Psychiatric Rating Scale (Overall and Gorham, 1962), and the Scale for the 
Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; Andreasen, 1984) have been 
used most frequently to assess delusions in clinical groups as well as co-
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occurring symptoms such as hallucinations and grandiosity. The multi-
dimensional Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS; Haddock et al., 
1999; Drake et al., 2007) assesses delusional conviction, preoccupation, 
distress and disruption. This is considered an improvement on the above 
measures (Freeman et al., 2008). 
 
Scales more specific to persecutory ideation have also been developed.  The 
Paranoia Scale (PS) (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) was designed to assess 
non-clinical paranoid thoughts in college students. This questionnaire 
assesses mistrust and resentment and not thoughts that are clearly 
persecutory (Freeman et al., 2008). The Paranoia/Suspiciousness 
Questionnaire (PSQ) (Rawlings and Freeman, 1996) was developed on non-
clinical participants from an interest in the concept of schizotypy and aimed to 
measure a broad concept of paranoid/suspiciousness. It is argued that this 
scale assesses more than paranoid thoughts and reflects a broader 
conceptualisation of paranoia than the Paranoia Scale (Freeman et al., 
2008).  The Paranoid Thoughts Scales (G-PTS) (Green et al., 2006) is an 
assessment tool based upon the definition of persecutory ideation by 
Freeman and Garety (2000).  It includes content which is clearly persecutory, 
with clinical and non-clinical items and assesses several dimensions of 
paranoid experience.   
 
Although symptom-based research has brought paranoid experience into 
greater focus and made clearer which elements a researcher and/or clinician 
may be interested in assessing, there is much development work needed on 
measurement (Freeman, 2008). To date, only two questionnaires have been 
developed specifically for individuals with persecutory delusions within a 
clinical setting. The Safety Behaviours Questionnaire- Persecutory Beliefs 
(SBQ) (Freeman et al., 2001) assesses the strategies that individuals use to 
protect themselves, which prevent the fears from being disconfirmed 
(Freeman et al., 2001, 2007).  The Details of Threat Questionnaire assesses 
the content of persecutory thoughts to identify the most distressing aspects 
of the experience (Freeman et al., 2001). The starting point for the 
development of this measure was based on the definition by Freeman and 
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Garety (2000) where persecutory delusions are understood as threat beliefs. 
Specific items on this measure include; delusional conviction, delusional 
distress, power of the persecutor and the imminence of threat. 
 
As evidence has indicated a close relationship between paranoia and affect 
(Fowler et al., 2006b; Startup et al., 2003; 2004; Startup et al., 2007), scales 
assessing delusions and persecutory delusions are often used in conjunction 
with other instruments which assess emotional disorder. Such measures 
may include Beck‟s Depression Inventory (BDI), Beck‟s Anxiety Inventory 
(BAI) and Distress Anxiety Stress Scales, (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995).  However, the above questionnaires are very global in design and do 
not comment specifically or make any connection to persecutory delusions. 
There is no assessment tool available measuring a range of aspects of 
emotional distress (such as anxiety, depression, anger and shame) 
associated with persecutory delusions in the one measure. 
 
1.6.2. The BSER Scale 
The Belief Specific Emotional Response scale (BSER) is a novel self report 
assessment tool, in the early stages of development.  The starting point for 
the development of this measure was based on the definition by Freeman 
and Garety (2000) where persecutory delusions are understood as threat 
beliefs. The aim for its design was to specifically measure a wide range of 
emotions of relevance to the content of persecutory delusions within a clinical 
population.  The BSER scale differs from other measures of affect in that 
items were selected which were most relevant to those with delusions; 
anxiety, depression, anger, shame and guilt. 
 
The BSER scale differs from other measures of affect in that items were 
selected which were most relevant to those with delusions; anxiety, 
depression, anger, shame and guilt. Considering specific emotions with this 
scale is important in attempting to discover which emotions play an important 
contributory role to the development of persecutory delusions. It will help 
confirm or refute the research hypotheses of this study. 
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In addition to the Safety Behaviours Questionnaire and Details of Threat 
Questionnaire, the BSER scale will be the third measure developed for the 
clinical population for individuals with persecutory delusions.  The BSER 
scale is novel in this area as it is not a global assessment of emotional 
problems such as the BDI and BAI. Rather, it is a tool to assess emotions 
particularly in relation to persecutory delusions. In its specificity, this scale 
reiterates the single symptom approach to phenomena in design and is the 
only scale to address the importance of the association between emotions 
and persecutory delusions as argued in the cognitive model by Freeman et 
al. (2002). 
 
 
1.7.  Potential contribution of study 
The current study has the potential to provide further evidence for the 
cognitive models of persecutory delusions that posit direct links between 
content of delusions and emotions. In addition, it may offer a more thorough 
understanding of the associations between specific appraisals (such as 
deservedness of threat) and specific types of emotions not previously 
investigated, such as anger and shame. These findings may then have the 
potential to inform psychological interventions for delusions. 
  
1.7.1  Contribution to knowledge represented by the study 
It can be argued that the area of persecutory delusions has been extensively 
researched.  However, due to the complexity of the paranoid experience, the 
field of study for this area is vast, with a number of areas that have not yet 
been fully explored.  As stated earlier, only two studies examine the specific 
area of interest of this study (Green et al., 2006; Freeman et al., 2001). 
Therefore, further exploration will contribute and add to the knowledge and 
understanding of this area and persecutory delusions in general. 
 
1.7.2.    Verification and systematic replication. 
As there are few studies regarding content and emotions within persecutory 
delusions, it was felt useful to verify the results of the previous studies 
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through systematic replication. The theory (cognitive /single symptom/ multi-
factorial approach) acting as foundation for this study remains identical to 
previous studies. Two of the measures have also been used in this study as 
in previous studies: the Details of Threat questionnaire (Freeman, 2001) and 
the Social Avoidance and Distress scale (Watson and Friend, 1969). Using 
this method, some of the previous predictions based on Freeman et al. 
(2002) multi-factorial cognitive model for persecutory delusions will be tested.  
Through replication, results from this study will contribute to knowledge by 
adding to the few studies which highlight the importance of emotions and 
content in persecutory delusions. 
 
 
1.7.3.   Extension 
As stated previously in this introduction, the cognitive model for persecutory 
delusions alludes to several factors involved in the development of 
persecutory delusions, which includes emotions.  The interest of this study is 
the role of emotions in this model.  Freeman et al. (2002) focus on the 
emotions of anxiety, and, to a lesser extent, depression, as primary 
emotions.  However, there is some evidence indicating that other emotions 
such as anger and shame can also be relevant in persecutory delusions.  
This study, therefore, will contribute to the knowledge of persecutory 
delusions by extending the focus of emotions to include a broader range. 
 
1.7.4.    Improving measurement. 
The BSER scale (although still in development), is the only scale to assess a 
range of emotions that are relevant to threat beliefs in persecutory delusions.  
Having an assessment instrument which captures this, will help in 
understanding factors that may contribute to the paranoid experience and 
add to the research methodology of the phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER 2:  METHOD  
2.1    Ethical approval 
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of East London‟s Ethics 
Committee and a London based NHS Research Ethics Committee. In 
addition, this study was granted approval from the local Research and 
Development Department (See Appendices A-C for approval documents) 
 
2.2. Design 
This study was cross sectional, designed to explore possible relationships 
between content and emotions in individuals who experience persecutory 
delusions.  The study employed seven measures assessing threat beliefs 
and emotional responses of the participants.  
 
2.3. Participants 
As illustrated in Figure 2, 67 participants were referred for this study.  Five 
individuals were considered not suitable for the study due to lack of 
persecutory threat beliefs. Twenty-five individuals refused to participate in 
the study. Of these, 23 were from in-patient wards (16 from the psychosis 
specialist unit, 8 from acute wards and 1 from the forensic unit) and 2 from 
two out-patient research registers; the Psychological Interventions Clinic for 
outpatients with Psychosis (PICuP), and the Social, Hope and Recovery 
Project (SHARP). 
 
Thirty-seven individuals agreed to participate in the study.  Of the 37 
individuals, 29 individuals were recruited from the in-patient units (20 from 
the psychosis specialist unit, 6 from the acute wards and 3 from the forensic 
unit) and 8 were recruited from the two out-patient registers 
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Figure 2. Recruitment pathway for participants 
  
2.3.1.    Inclusion criteria 
The presence of positive symptoms of psychosis was assessed by an initial 
mental state examination. The presence of persecutory delusions was 
established by the first question of the Details of Threat Questionnaire and 
had to meet criteria A and B as specified by Freeman and Garety (2000): 
 
Criteria A:  The individual believes that harm is occurring, or is  
                  going to occur, to him or her. 
Criteria B: The individual believes that the persecutor has the intention  
                  to cause harm. 
 
This was ascertained in the opening clinical interview. The presence of 
persecutory delusions was also verified by a review of the potential 
participant‟s medical notes. 
 
 
20 from 
psychosis 
specialist unit 
6 from 
acute units 
3 from 
forensic 
units 
 67 individuals referred for 
study 
 
 5 not 
suitable 
37 
participated 
25 refused 
participation 
23 in-
patients 
8 out-
patients 
29 in-
patients 
2 out-
patients 
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2.3.2.  Exclusion criteria 
Individuals were not considered for participation in the study: 
1. If there was an insufficient level of the English language to 
participate in the study.   
2. In individuals were too distressed to be engaged, were acutely 
psychotic and/or were unable to give informed consent as stated 
by their Responsible medical officer. .  
 
2.4.    Measures  
Five measures were used in this study (Please see Appendix D-H)).  They 
were chosen to address the research questions in capturing the details of 
threat beliefs in persecutory delusions and associated emotional distress. 
The following provides a description of measures. 
 
2.4.1.     Measure of content.  
2.4.1.2.     Details of Threat Measure (DoT) 
The interest of this study was the content of persecutory delusions.  Of the 
two questionnaires which are specific to persecutory delusions, The Details 
of Threat measure (DoT) (Freeman et al., 2001) was decided to be the most 
appropriate. This measure contains 17 questions that obtain specific details 
of threat beliefs of persecutory delusions for each participant (Please see 
Appendix D), namely: the perceived power of the persecutor, deservedness 
of threat and the ability to cope. 
 
The test-retest reliability for the DoT measure is low, ranging r=.62, p=.07-
.89, when threat will occur to r=-.46, p=-.82- .19, distress, (Freeman et al., 
2001).  However, the low reliability reflects real changes in delusional beliefs 
rather than measurement error, since delusions fluctuate over time (Brett-
Jones et al., 1987; Buchanan et al., 1993; Garety et al., 2005; Freeman, 
2008; Freeman & Garety, 2000; Freeman, Garety & Kuipers, 2001). More 
importantly, this measure was reported to have good validity (Freeman et al., 
2001). Internal consistency for this measure is not reported. 
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2.4.2.   Emotion Measures 
2.4.2.1.      Beck’s Depression Inventory (Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988b)   
This measure is a 21 question multiple choice self-report inventory that is 
one of the most widely used instrument for measuring the severity of 
depression (please see Appendix E for a copy of this measure). Each item is 
scored on a 3-point scale from 0-3, and item scores are summed to give a 
total score.  Scores range from 0-63, with higher scores indicating higher 
levels of depression (0-13, minimal; 14-19, mild; 20-28, moderate; 29-62 
severe).  The BDI has been extensively tested for content validity, concurrent 
validity and construct validity. It has also been extensively tested for reliability 
and internal consistency (Beck et al., 1987).  A high correlation (r=.91) 
between the BDI and the Calgary Depression Scale for Schizophrenia 
(Addington, Addington & Maticka-Tyndale,1993) has been reported by 
Birchwood et al. (2000) suggesting  that the BDI could be used for assessing 
depression in psychosis.  
   
2.4.2.2.     Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (Beck, Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988a)  
This measure consists of 21 items, each describing a common symptom of 
anxiety, designed to discriminate anxiety from depression (please see 
Appendix F for a copy of this measure). Each item‟s response format is 
based on a 0-3 scale (i.e., 0 „not at all‟; 1, „mildly‟-it did not bother me much; 
2. „moderately‟-it was very unpleasant but I could stand it; and 3, „severely‟-I 
could barely stand it). Item scores are summed to create a total score 
ranging between 0-63. Higher scores indicate higher anxiety. (0-9, normal; 
10-18, mild; 19-29, moderate; 30-63, severe). This measure has also been 
extensively tested for validity and reliability (Beck et al., 1987). 
 
2.4.2.3.     Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SAD) (Watson and Friend, 
1969)  
This is a 28 true/false item self-report scale designed to measure avoidance 
and distress experiences in social situations (please see Appendix G for a 
copy of this measure). Higher scores (the cut-off score for social anxiety is 
reported as 15) represent higher levels of social anxiety. Leary (1991) 
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reported the SAD has good reliability (Cronbach‟s alpha is reported as .90) 
(Cronbach, 1951). Watson and Friend (1969) reported that this measure 
demonstrated sufficient concurrent validity and adequate test-retest reliability 
after a one month interval (r=.68). 
 
2.4.2.4.    The Belief Specific Emotional Response Scale (BSER) 
The Belief Specific Emotional Response scale (BSER) is a self report 
assessment tool developed for this study to be used for clinical groups 
(please see appendix H for a copy of this measure). It was designed to 
specifically measure emotions in relation to the content of persecutory 
delusions.   
 
The BSER was developed to assess on a very general level the four most 
prominent emotions (depression, anxiety, anger, and shame; please see 
Appendix H) in relation to threat beliefs. Using a similar approach to Brown et 
al. (2000) in terms of scale development, emotions were chosen based on 
recurring themes in previous theoretical literature on the role of emotion in 
persecutory delusions. They were also chosen due to empirical studies 
postulating an association between content and specific emotions (Freeman 
et al., 2001; Bentall et al., 1994; Trower & Chadwick, 1995; Startup et al., 
2003; Green et al., 2006).  
Additionally, the emotions explored were based on emotional themes 
encountered during the researcher‟s previous clinical experience of this 
population. 
  
The BSER scale was initially designed with 50 words which were categorised 
into 5 subscales. The words were obtained from a number of published 
sources.  Shame, depression and anxiety were selected from emotional 
Stroop tasks (Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996).  Guilt words were 
obtained from Harder and Zalma (1990) and Zuckerman et al. (1983).  Anger 
words were obtained from the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL) 
hostility scale (Zuckerman et al., (1983).   All words were checked for 
frequency levels in the British language (Hofland & Johansson, 1982). 
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Participants were asked to rate the emotions based on the following 
instructions; „Some or all of these words may describe the way you feel when 
you think about whom or what is threatening you. Please read the following 
words carefully and indicate with a tick the words which best describe the 
way you feel’. The instructions were adapted partially from the BAI. The 
ratings were made on a five point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 5 
(very much).   
 
The initial scale was piloted with five participants who experienced 
persecutory delusions. The words that were rated most frequently were kept.  
This scale and selection of items were reviewed further by two clinical 
psychologists who have researched and published prolifically in the area of 
persecutory delusions.  They were involved in reducing the number of words 
from 50 to 25. 
 
Based on the responses from the participants, a 25 word Belief Specific 
Emotional Response Scale (BSER) with five subscales was established. The 
words for each subscale are as follows; 
 
       1. Shame words: ashamed, ridiculed, humiliated, mocked, embarrassed. 
       2.  Anger words: angry, annoyed, irritated, furious, enraged. 
       3.  Depression words: miserable, depressed, hopeless, despair, gloomy. 
4. Anxiety words: panicked, anxious, frightened, worried,  
                                   scared, nervous. 
       5. Guilt words: guilty, regretful, remorseful, wicked, blame worthy. 
 
The value assigned to an item on this measure ranged from 0- 4. 
Participants could obtain a maximum score of 20 for each subscale. A score 
of 10-19 was considered as moderate to severe, 1-9 considered mild and 0 
none.  This new BSER measure was incorporated into the interview for the 
study.  
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Overall internal consistency, internal consistency for each subscale, test-
retest reliability and validity for this scale is reported in the results section of 
this thesis. 
  
2.5.     Additional information 
A number ID was assigned to each individual who participated in the study.  
The codes and corresponding names were kept in a locked cabinet 
accessible only to the researcher. Demographic information was taken from 
each participant‟s clinical file upon completion of the interview, and stored 
anonymously into a computer database using the number ID. This 
information included age, gender, ethnicity, diagnosis and section status. 
2.6.      Procedure 
2.6.1.     In-patient recruitment 
Recruitment from in-patient units occurred from one specialist psychosis unit, 
two acute wards and one forensic unit within SLAM. The Responsible 
Medical Officer (RMO) was asked via letter from the researcher for consent 
for interview and to recommend service users who experienced persecutory 
delusions within the last two weeks or had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
schizo-affective disorder or delusional disorder (please see Appendix I for a 
copy of the consent form).  The RMO would then identify potential 
participants personally or refer the researcher to members of his/her team on 
the given ward who could offer more assistance.  
 
The manager for the given in-patient unit was also contacted to request 
permission to visit the ward and for the most suitable times to interview 
participants.  Ward managers in question notified the staff (mental health 
nurses, occupational therapists, nursing assistants) on the given day that 
identified potential participants through diagnosis and/or personal knowledge 
of the given patients‟ experiences.  
 
 
Potential participants were then approached by the researcher, accompanied 
by a staff member to discuss the study briefly and to ask permission to 
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interview. If agreed by the patient, an information sheet was given with 
further information about the study (Please see Appendix J for a copy of the 
information sheet). The purpose and procedure of the study was explained 
fully to the participant prior to the interview.  It was made explicit that the 
patient could discontinue the study at any time. If patients wished to 
participate, a consent form was filled (Please see Appendix K for a copy of 
the consent form).  The consent form retained the participants‟ name only. 
 
The interview occurred in a quiet room on the unit as designated by 
members of staff. Participants were given £10.00 as reimbursement for their 
time. 
2.6.2.    Out-patient recruitment 
Two out-patient services (PICuP and SHARP) were identified as having 
research registers where service users had given consent to be approached 
by researchers to participate in studies. The researcher of the current study 
first requested permission from the Responsible Medical Officers to 
approach patients on their research register for interview.  Once agreed, 
administrators of the two research registers identified possible suitable 
service user from the registers for the current study. Potential participants 
from the out-patient‟s unit were written to and invited to take part in the 
current study.   The initial invitation consisted of an information sheet 
providing a basic outline of the research. This was followed up by a 
telephone call by the researcher a week later. If the service user agreed, a 
time and date was arranged. Interviews occurred in a designated room in the 
out-patients‟ service base. Out-patient participants were also paid £10.00 as 
reimbursement for their time. 
 
 
2.6.3.    Interview process 
Prior to the interview with each participant, the study was discussed by the 
researcher with the given individual. They were informed of the issues which 
were to be raised to ensure that they were fully aware of the content of the 
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study. The researcher was present in the location of the interview with 
participants of the study.   
 
Twenty-seven participants preferred the researcher to write their verbal 
answers on the questionnaires for them. This was performed in front of the 
given participant.  The remaining participants completed the questionnaires 
personally.  They were able to ask questions or seek clarification for the 
measures. Once completed, a debriefing period occurred where the 
participant was able to further discuss any issues in regards to the study.  
 
The interviews took approximately one hour for the participant going through 
the measures in one sitting.  The order of the measures was fixed. The 
Details of threat Questionnaire was completed first, followed by the BSER 
scale.  The BDI, BAI and the SAD scale were then administered. Eight 
participants (all inpatients) had more than one sitting to complete the 
interview. Six participants had two sittings to complete the interview with a 
one hour break between interviews. The researcher returned two to three 
days later to the specialist psychosis unit to complete the interview with two 
participants as they wished continue the interview another day. 
  
2.7.    Data analysis 
Analyses were conducted using SPSS version 18 (PASW Statistics 18).  
Cronbach‟s alpha coefficients were calculated to assess the internal 
consistency of the BSER scale.  
 
 
2.7.1.   Statistical strategy 
Prior to conducting and statistical analyses, the data were examined to 
determine if they met the criteria for the use of parametric statistics (i.e., 
normal distribution).  This was done by considering the skewness and 
kurtosis of each variable. As stated by Field (2009), tests of skew and 
kurtosis are sample size dependant and one of the sterner cut-offs is 
anything above +/-1 is not normally distributed. In addition, normal 
distribution was considered visually with the use of bar charts (see order of 
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appendices). The data was not normally distributed and therefore non 
parametric analyses were carried out (Siegal &Castellan, 1998) to test the 
research hypotheses. One-tailed tests were used when there were clear 
directional hypotheses (Kimmel, 1957).  A significance level of p ≤ .05 was 
used and 05 < p < .1 are reported as trends. 
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CHAPTER 3:   RESULTS  
 
This chapter presents first the demographic, clinical details and descriptive 
statistics of the sample.  This will be followed by testing of the experiential 
hypotheses of the study.  Next, the consistency, reliability and validity of the 
BSER measure will be presented. Finally, a concise presentation of relevant 
contextual descriptive data will be discussed.   
 
3.1.    Basic demographic and clinical data. 
 
Of the thirty-seven participants who took part in the study, seventeen 
participants were male and twenty participants were female.  The mean age 
of the group was 37.5 (S.D. =9.41, range = 20-54, median 36).  
Predominantly, the ethnicity of the group was white British (N=27). The 
second largest group in terms of ethnicity were clients of Black African 
Caribbean origin (N=4). Other ethnicities were represented within the clinical 
sample with less frequency. 
 
In terms of clinical setting, twenty-nine participants were in-patients and eight 
participants were out-patients.  All were medicated. Twenty-five of the 
participants were held under Section 3 of the Mental Health Act (N=25). 
Twelve of the participants were informal. The majority of the group had a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia (N=18).  The second most common diagnosis 
was paranoid schizophrenia (N=11). Please see Table 1 for full details of 
demographical and clinical data. 
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Table 1. 
 
Demographical and Clinical Data (N=37) 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.2. Descriptive statistics 
Since there are very few studies exploring the detailed phenomenology of 
persecutory delusions as discussed in the introduction, and the hypotheses 
analysed in this study are based on content, it was determined to be 
important to present some basic descriptive data on responses to the items 
on the Details of threat (DoT) questionnaire and affect in this group.  
A summary of individual participants‟ persecutory threat beliefs are 
presented in the order of appendices. This information was taken from 
participants‟ responses to question 1. Of the Details of Threat Questionnaire 
(DoT).   Further information is presented in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number (n) 37 
 
Percentages % 
Male 17 45.9 
Female 20  54.1 
   
Black African Caribbean 4 10.8 
Black African 1 2.7 
Black British 1 2.7 
Indian 2 5.4 
Iraqi 1 2.7 
White British 27 73.0 
White Spanish 1 2.7 
   
In-patient 29 78.4 
Out-patient 8 21.6 
   
Informal 12 32.4 
Sectioned 25 67.6 
   
Schizophrenia 18 48.6 
Paranoid schizophrenia 11  29.7 
Treatment resistant 
schizophrenia 
3 8.1 
Schizo affective disorder 3 8.1 
Schizoid personality 
disorder 
1 2.7 
Unspecified psychosis 1 2.7 
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3.1.2.1.    Persecutory delusion content. 
 
Table 2.   
Descriptive statistics for the Details of Threat Questionnaire.  
 
The overall scores on the DoT questionnaire are presented above in Table 2. 
Further details of threat are given in the order of appendices. Some details, 
however, are relevant to the research hypotheses and will be presented 
here. These include details with reference to the persecutor, deservedness 
of threat and ability to cope. Seven participants (18.9%) who felt persecuted 
specifically identified their persecutors. This could include family, friends, 
ward staff, other patients on the ward and neighbours.  Persecutors also 
included strangers to the participants such as „the Dolling Brothers‟. A further 
five participants (13.5%) identified non-human or paranormal persecutors.  
Examples of the non-human or paranormal persecutors include „E.T.‟, 
„Aliens‟, „God‟, „the mental health system‟.   Five participants (13.5%) felt 
there was a more generalised organised conspiracy against them.  One such 
example is participant no. 35 who felt threatened that a system was trying to 
control his mind so that he could „become a father and abide by their rules’.    
Nine participants (24%) indentified their persecutors as „voices‟ which could 
not be identified and threatened harm. This point will be explored in the 
discussion chapter of this thesis as it reflects the co-occurrence of 
symptoms. 
 
 Power of 
persecutor 
Certainty 
of harm 
 Hours 
under 
threat 
Awfulness 
of threat 
Deserved 
threat 
Threat 
being 
unfair 
Control 
of 
threat 
Coping 
with 
threat 
 N    valid 
                                         
missing 
  37 
 
   0 
37 
 
0 
37 
 
0 
37 
 
0 
37 
 
0 
37 
 
0 
37 
 
0 
37 
 
0 
Mean  7.68 90.81 12.43 8.70 1.49 6.46 3.57 4.57 
Std. 
Deviation 
2.37 15.92 8.40 2.41 2.26 3.99 3.26 3.67 
Median 8 100 12 0 0  8 3 4 
Mode 10 100 24 10 0 10 0 0 
Minimum 0 45 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 10 100 24 10 10 10 10 10 
Skewness  1.285 1.82 .009 2.29 2.263 .745 .552 .177 
Kurtosis 2.076 2.406 1.561 4.88 4.882 1.108 .719 1.359 
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In terms of power and deservedness appraisals, 23 participants (62.1%) 
rated the persecutor of the persecutor as high (8 and above- question 9 in 
the Details of Threat questionnaire) with 12 participants (32.4%) obtaining 
the maximum score of ten for this question.  Twenty-five participants (67.6%) 
reported that they did not feel they deserved the harm (rating of 0 on item 12 
of the DoT questionnaire). These participants would fit the „poor-me‟ 
paranoia description (Trower & Chadwick, 1995). Two participants (5.4%) 
reported that they felt the harm was deserved (rating of 10 on item 12 of the 
DoT questionnaire fitting the „bad-me‟ paranoia description (Trower & 
Chadwick, 1995).  Of the remaining participants, nine participants (24.3%) 
obtained low scores for deservedness of threat (rating between 1 and 5 on 
item 12 of the DOT questionnaire and one participant obtained a score of 7.  
 
In terms of coping, nine participants (24.3%) rated their ability to cope as 
zero.  A further eight participants (21.6%) rated their ability to cope between 
one and three. This leads to a total sum of 45.9% rating their ability to cope 
as three and below. 
 
3.1.2.2.     Assessment of emotional distress 
In addition to the phenomenology of persecutory delusions, the data in 
relation to emotional responses by participant is also extremely relevant to 
the investigation of the given hypotheses of this study. Table 3 below 
illustrates the descriptive statistics for this clinical group with reference to the 
responses from the standardised emotion measures. 
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Table 3.   
 
Descriptive Statistics for Standardised Emotion Measures 
 Beck 
Depression 
Inventory 
Beck 
Anxiety 
Inventory 
Social 
Avoidance 
and Distress 
Scale 
Mean 14.76 16.00 12.24 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
8.5 
 
10.50 
 
8.0 
Range 1-30 3-35 1-26 
  
 
Depression was common in this group.  Further examination highlighted that 
three participants (8.1%) had severe depression (BDI ≥ 29); nine (24.3%) 
had moderate to severe depression (20 ≤ BDI ≤ 28); eight (21.6%) had 
moderate to mild depression (14 ≤ BDI ≤ 19) and fifteen (40.5%) had no 
significant depression (BDI ≤ 15) (cut-offs taken from, Beck, Steer and Brown 
(1996). 
 
Anxiety was also frequent within this group. Five participants (13.5%) had 
severe anxiety (30 ≤ BAI ≤ 63); 13 (35.1%) had moderate to severe anxiety 
(19 ≤ BAI ≤ 29); 3 (8.1%) had mild to moderate anxiety (10 ≤BAI ≤ 18) and 
15 (40.5%) fell within the normal range for anxiety (9 ≤ BAI ≤ 0). 
 
Social avoidance and distress was also found, but less frequently than 
depression and anxiety; 11 participants (29.7%) scored 15 and above for this 
scale (the cut-off score for social anxiety). Two participants (5.4%) scored 26 
out of a possible 28 points indicating very high social anxiety.  However, 17 
(45.9%) participants scored 10 and below with 3 participants scoring one 
point.  
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3.1.2.3.     BSER Measure  
3.1.2.3.1.     Internal consistency 
 
Cronbach‟s α was used to evaluate the internal consistency of the new 
measure designed for the study- Belief Specific Emotional Response Scale 
(BSER) scale (Cronbach, 1951). Field (2009) reports a value of .8 or higher 
indicative of good internal consistency.  The BSER scale had good internal 
consistency with an overall Cronbach‟s α = .849.   The subscales also had 
good internal consistency ranging from .886 (anxiety) to .941 (anger).  See 
Table 4. for the internal consistencies of the BSER subscales.  
 
Table 4.  
Cronbach’s α for BSER Subscales 
Anger Sadness Anxiety Shame Guilt 
 
.941 
 
.931 
 
.886 
 
.940 
 
.934 
 
3.1.2.3.3.    Test-retest reliability 
Eight participants repeated the BSER scale over a period of two weeks so 
that test-retest reliability could be determined.  The total mean score on the 
first occasion was 60.62 (S.D.=15.01) and  52.52 (S.D.= 16.17)  on the 
second occasion. Pearson‟s correlation illustrated good test-retest reliability 
[r=. 56. p=.001]. 
 
3.1.2.3.3.    Validity  
Spearman‟s rho‟s test was used to consider associations between the 
specific subscales representing different emotions (sadness, anxiety, and 
shame) and standardised questionnaires (BDI and BAI).  The BDI scores 
and the BSER sadness scale were positively correlated (Spearman‟s r=.55, 
p=<0.01) and BAI and the BSER anxiety subscale were also correlated 
(r=.38, p<0.05). 
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3.1.2.3.4.     BSER descriptive subscale data 
The scores within the subscales of the BSER scale were considered (See 
Table 5. Below). 
 
Table 5.   
 
Descriptive Data for BSER Subscales 
 Mean   S.D. Range Skewness Kurtosis 
Total BSER 
Score 
 42.29 17.47 18-83   
  
Subscale scores 
     
    Anger  10.29 7.2 0-20 .108 1.392 
    Sadness   9.86  6.47  0-20 .120 1.163 
    Anxiety   11.8  6.27  0-20 .300 .659 
    Shame   4.75  6.02  0-20 .865 .651 
    Guilt   5.56  6.69  0-20 .920 .397 
  
 
As seen in Table 5, the subscale anger was not normally distributed. More 
detailed examination of this subscale highlighted that 8 (21.6%) participants 
obtained the maximum score of 20 for anger.  Fifteen (40.5%) participants 
obtained scores between 10-19 and 7(18.9%) participants between 1and 9.  
Six (16.2%) participants obtained a score of zero.  
 
Similar to the BDI scores, the BSER sadness subscale revealed relatively 
high scores. This subscale was not normally distributed. Further investigation 
illustrated that 3 (8.1%) participants obtained the maximum total score of 20 
for this subscale. Nineteen (51.3%) participants obtained scores between 10 
and 19, and 10 (27%) participants obtained scores between 1and 9.  Five 
(13.5%) participants scored zero. 
 
As found with the BAI, there were some high scores within the anxiety 
subscale.  This subscale was normally distributed. Seven (18.9%) 
participants obtained the maximum score of 20. Eighteen (48.6%) 
participants obtained scores between 10 and 19, and 8 (21.6%) scored 
between 1and 9.  Four (10.8%) participants scored zero.  
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The subscale of shame was normally distributed. Further investigations 
illustrated that eighteen (48.6%) participants obtained a score of zero. Eight 
(21.6%) participants scored between 1-9 and 10 (27%) participants scored 
between 10 and 19.  One (2.7%) participant obtained the maximum score for 
shame. 
 
The subscale guilt was normally distributed. Further examination found that 
seventeen participants obtained a score of zero. Eight (21.6%) participants 
scored between 1and 9, and 10(27%) participants scored between10 and 
19.  Two (5.4%) participants obtained the maximum score of 20 for guilt.  
 
3.1.2.4.  Intercorrelations of BDI, BAI and BSER subscales 
Table 6. presents a correlation matrix of the intercorrelations of the BDI, BAI 
and BSER subscales. 
 
From a visual scan of the correlation matrix, and considering the coefficients 
greater than 0.3, there are some correlations between the BDI and BAI with 
some of the BSER subscale scores. The BDI correlates with the BSER 
subscale Totalsadn. (total sadness score) (r=.536). The BAI correlates with 
the BSER subscale Totalanx (total anxiety score) (r=.408). The BDI and BAI 
are correlated (r=.373) and in a similar pattern the BSER subscales of 
Totalsadn and Totalanx are correlated (r=.522). The BAI and BSER subscale 
Totalsadn are correlated (r=.338). Similarly, the BDI and BSER subscale 
Totalanx are correlated (r=.423).  One further correlation is highlighted; the 
BDI and the BSER subscale Totalguilt were correlated (r=.301). As seen in 
Table 6., there are no further correlations. 
 
The above correlations suggest that the patterns of correlations between the 
BDI, BAI and the BSER subscales of sadness and anxiety might be 
accounted for by the same underlying emotions.  It also suggests that the 
BSER subscales of sadness and anxiety measure similar underlying 
dimensions of emotions.  This presents further evidence for the validity of the 
BSER scale as a measure. 
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Table 6. 
 
Correlation Matrix of the Intercorrelations of Total BDI, BAI and BSER 
subscale scores.  
Correlations greater than .30 are shown in parentheses. 
 
3.2.     Experimental Hypotheses 
3.2.1.    Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1:   It is predicted that the power of the persecutor will be 
positively correlated to depression. 
 
To determine whether power of the persecutor is associated with depression, 
scores on the Details of Threat question 9. were correlated using Spearman 
Rho with both BDI and BSER sadness subscale scores.  There was no 
significant association between the power of the persecutor and depression 
either for BDI (rho =.39, p>0.01) or BSER sadness subscale (rho= -.24, 
p=.153). 
 
Surprisingly, in both cases the correlation was negative, indicating that the 
higher the depression the lower the perceived power, which is in the opposite 
direction to the hypothesis.  A visual inspection of a scatter plot of the scores 
for the BSER sadness subscale and perceived power (since this was the 
larger correlation) was conducted to examine the data further (see scatter 
plot 1).  
 
Variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Totalang 1.000       
(2) Totalsadn .142 1.000      
(3) Totalanx -.161 (.522) 1.000     
(4) Totalguilt -.018 .128 .105 1.000    
(5) Totalshame .162 .246 .066 .240 1.000   
(6) TotalBDI .041 (.536) (.432) (.301) .095 1.000  
(7) BAITot -.024 (.338) (.408) .221 -.070 (.373) 1.000 
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Scatter Plot 1.  
 
 Distributions between power of the persecutor and depression. 
 
 
Key 
Totsadn= 
total score for 
BSER 
sadness 
subscale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in Scatter plot 1, thirteen participants obtained maximum 
scores for either power of the persecutor or sadness. Eight participants 
obtained the maximum score for the power of the persecutor. However, 
contrary to the hypothesis of this study and that of previous studies, their sad 
scores varied from minimum to maximum scores. In fact, one participant had 
the maximum score for sadness but felt that the persecutor had no power.  
Only one participant achieved the maximum score for power of the 
persecutor and sadness.  
 
Of the 24 participants who did not rate maximum scores for either variable, 
five scored 5 or below for the power of the persecutor.  However, the sad 
scores for this group varied from low scores to high scores.  Reasons for 
these unusual findings will be explored in the discussion. 
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Hypothesis 2:   It is predicted that the power of the persecutor scores will be 
positively correlated with anxiety and social anxiety. 
 
To determine whether the power of the persecutor was associated with 
anxiety, Spearman Rho correlations were carried out between the Details of 
Threat question 9 and the BAI, the BSER anxiety subscale, and SAD total 
scores. There were no significant associations between the power of the 
persecutor and anxiety on either the BAI (rho=-.17, p=.30), the BSER anxiety 
scale (rho= -.316, p=.06), or social anxiety (rho=.04, p=.42; 1-tailed test). 
However, contrary to the hypothesis, both the correlations with BAI and with 
BSER anxiety were negative, indicating that higher perceived power was 
associated with lower anxiety. A visual inspection of a scatter plot of the 
scores was carried out to have a closer look at this finding (see scatter plot 2; 
only the BSER anxiety subscale is shown as it was the correlation with the 
highest magnitude).  These findings will be explored further in the discussion. 
 
Scatter plot 2. 
 
  Distributions between power of the persecutor and anxiety. 
 
 
 
Key 
Totsanx  
= total score 
for BSER 
anxiety 
subscale                        
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Scatter plot 2 demonstrates a similar pattern to that of scatter plot 1. Nine 
participants obtained the maximum scores for the power of the persecutor.  
However, their levels of anxiety varied from extreme anxiety at the far top 
right of the scatter plot to the far top left of the scatter plot.  The scatter plot 
illustrates most participants (with the exclusion of two) had high scores of 5 
or above in terms of the power of the persecutor.  However, they had 
variable levels of anxiety. This finding will also be explored further in the 
discussion of this thesis. 
  
Hypothesis 3:   It is predicted that the deservedness of threat scores will be 
positively correlated to the BSER anger scores. 
It was found that there was no significant association between deservedness 
of threat and anger (rho=.01, p=.28; 1-tailed test). 
 
Hypothesis 4:    It is predicted that the deservedness of threat scores will  
be positively correlated with shame scores. 
To determine whether deservedness of threat is associated with shame, 
scores on the Details of Threat question 12 were correlated with BSER 
shame subscale scores.  The correlation was not significant (rho=.18, 
p=.144; 1-tailed test).  
 
Hypothesis 5:    It is predicted that the ability to cope will be  
negatively correlated with shame scores. 
Scores on the Details of Threat question 11 were correlated with self-
reported shame scores on the BSER shame scores, using Spearman‟s Rho. 
It was found that there was no significant correlation between coping and 
shame (BSER shame scale: rho=-.05, p=.39; 1-tailed tests). 
 
Hypothesis 6:   The ability to cope will be negatively correlated  
with depression.  
Scores on the Details of Threat question 11 were correlated with both BDI 
total scores and BSER sadness subscale scores using Spearman‟s Rho. As 
predicted it was found that there was some association between coping and 
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depression on both scores (BDI: rho=-.36, p=.014; BSER sadness scale: 
rho:-.53, p< .001; 1-tailed tests). 
 
3.3.   Contextual descriptive data 
 
Due to the surprising findings for hypotheses 1 and 2, where the correlations 
were in the opposite direction to the predictions, it was determined important 
to explore the data a little further. Some of the additional variables from the 
Detail of threat measure were explored to provide contextual descriptive 
data. Rather than choosing to explore multiple possible relationships, the 
power of the persecutor and depression in relation to other variables were 
considered given the seemingly robust evidence from previous studies. 
 
Two relevant items from the Details of threat measure were explored in 
relation to the power of the persecutor and depression as possible 
confounding variables.  
 
3.3.1.   Identity of the persecutor in relation to power of the persecutor and 
depression 
The descriptive data for the identity of the persecutor have been presented 
above in this results section.  This variable was inspected visually in a scatter 
plot in relation to the scores from power of the persecutor and BDI scores 
(see scatter plot 3). 
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Scatter plot 3.  
 
Identity of the persecutor in relation to power and depression scores 
                        
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key:  TotBDI = Total score for BSER subscale sadness 
 
As illustrated on scatter plot 3, 30 of the 37 participants (81%) had some idea 
of the identity of the persecutor. As stated previously in this results section, 
this could be individuals, non-human or paranormal persecutors.  However, 
from this scatter plot, this knowledge appears to have no bearing on their 
level of depression or perceived power. 
  
3.3.2.   Certainty of harm in relation to power of the persecutor and 
depression 
 
It is also possible that participants‟ perceived certainty of harm could have 
affected the relationship between perceived power and depression. Twenty-
four (65%) of the 37 participants rated their certainty of harm as 100%, with 
the remaining 13 (35%) rating their certainty of harm as over 50% but less 
than 100%. 
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Scatter plot 4.   
 
Certainty of harm in relation to power of the persecutor  
                         and depression. 
 
 
 
Key:  TotBDI = Total score for BSER sadness subscale 
 
As illustrated on scatter plot 4, certainty regarding harm did not seem to have 
a clear relationship with the power of the persecutor or depression. 
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CHAPTER 4:   DISCUSSION 
As stated in the introduction, the current study is a replication and extension 
of previous research within the field of persecutory delusions.  The aim was 
to explore emotional experiences associated with the content of persecutory 
delusions (such as appraisals of the threat belief) by broadening the range of 
emotions explored.  In terms of conceptualization, the starting point was a 
cognitive, single symptom approach, based on the multi-factorial cognitive 
model of Freeman et al. (2002).  In addition, clear criteria based on the 
definition of Freeman and Garety (2000), were used to ensure that 
persecutory delusions were studied and to avoid the inclusion of other 
delusions. 
 
The current study set out to test a number of predictions regarding 
associations between content of persecutory delusions and emotions. The 
clinical sample for this study was larger than that of (Freeman et al., 2001) 
and participants were interviewed directly unlike the study by Green et al. 
(2006). In addition to the standardised generic emotional disorders 
measures, a new measure developed for the study was utilized, which was 
specific to emotions related to persecutory delusions. 
 
In this final chapter, the findings of the current study are evaluated.  
Following this, there will be a discussion in relation to the existing theoretical 
approaches as described in the introduction.  A discussion of the limitations 
of this study, as well as its contributions to the general knowledge of 
relationships between persecutory delusions to emotions will be considered.  
The implications for theory and practice will follow. Recommendations for 
future research will be outlined.  Finally, I will conclude this thesis by 
reflecting on the process of conducting this research. 
 
4.1. Evaluation of findings in relation to research hypotheses 
 
4.1.1.    Replication hypotheses. 
 
One aim of this study was to replicate the findings of Green at al. (2006) and 
Freeman et al. (2001).  Both studies predicted that beliefs regarding the 
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power of the persecutor would be associated with depression.  Green et al. 
(2006) found that respondents who felt more powerful in the face of 
persecution had lower scores on the BDI, while Freeman et al. (2001) 
reported a trend for higher evaluation of the power of the persecutor to be 
associated with higher levels of depression. The present study did not 
replicate these findings, with no significant associations being found between 
the power of the persecutor and depression. This was the case for both BDI 
scores and the BSER depression subscale; interestingly, there was some 
suggestion that the higher the depression score, the lower the perceived 
power, which is the opposite direction to what was predicted. The same 
pattern was found in relation to associations between power appraisals and 
anxiety scores.  
 
The lack of a significant relationship and slight trend in the opposite direction 
to that which was expected, is unlikely to be due to a lack of power issue, 
since the study of Freeman et al. (2001) found significant effects with a 
smaller sample of 25 participants.  In addition, significant effects were found 
in this study when the variables of depression and coping were examined.  
Therefore, the findings are likely to be due to alternative reasons.  One 
possibility may be related to differences in demographic characteristics of the 
participants between the studies. 
 
One possibility is that the participants in the studies differed in some aspects.  
Examining the anxiety and depression scores of the three studies, it can be 
seen that the study of Green et al. (2006) had a reported mean BDI of 25.0 
(S.D. =13.5) and BAI 22.9 (S.D. =13.4). The Freeman et al. (2001) study 
reported a mean BDI of 23.2 (S.D= 12.9) and BAI 23.5 (S.D. =13.8). The 
participants in this study had a mean BDI of 14.7 (S.D. = 8.5) and BAI of 16.0 
(S.D. =10.5).   This suggests that the clinical sample of this study were the 
least depressed and least anxious of the three groups (see order of 
appendices comparison of the three studies‟ descriptive statistics for 
standardised emotion measures).   
 
62 
 
Furthermore, in the study of Freeman et al. (2001), 56% of the participants 
obtained a maximum score of 10 on the Details of Threat measure for power 
of the persecutor, compared to 32% of this study, indicating that there was a 
greater propensity to report high levels of power in the Freeman et al. (2001) 
study. 
 
Given the above comparison to the previous studies, it is possible that the 
present findings could be in part attributed to the participants in this study 
being less depressed and anxious, as well as fewer of them having 
maximum scores for the power of the persecutor. However, this is not a 
complete explanation for the findings, since it would not explain the direction 
of the relationship being in opposite direction to that which was predicted.  
 
Further examination of the findings using scatter plots highlighted an 
interesting pattern in regards to the distribution of scores. A number of 
participants had maximum scores for the power of the persecutor, indicating 
that they felt that their persecutor was very powerful.  However, contrary to 
expectations, they obtained low scores for depression or anxiety.  In 
essence, this particular subset of participants believed that the persecutor 
was powerful but these high power ratings were not associated with high 
scores on anxiety or depression.  
 
Additional examination of the results followed the analysis of the research 
hypothesis questions. Potential confounding variables which may have 
influenced the outcome were explored. These variables included the identity 
of the persecutor, certainty of harm and hours under threat were considered 
with reference to the power of the persecutor and depression. However, 
these appeared to have no bearing on the relationship between the power of 
the persecutor and emotion scores.  
 
Arguably, there may be several possible reasons for this.  This particular 
group of participants may have firm threat beliefs, but, the expected 
associated distress due to the appraisal of beliefs may be diminished, or 
negated due to multiple mediating factors not accounted for or explored in 
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this study.  One factor could be the in-patient versus out-patient status. 
Seventy-eight percent of the clinical sample of the study were in-patients. In 
comparison, this was the highest percentage of all three studies (comparing 
with the studies of Green et al., (2006) and Freeman et al., (2001)). As in-
patients, it is possible that participants felt a level of security which reduced 
their emotional distress despite their firm beliefs.   
 
A further factor affecting the findings could be the duration of illness. 
Information was not collected regarding the duration of time participants had 
held their threat beliefs. Participants could have held their threat beliefs for a 
long period of time, and initially could have felt anxious. However, after a 
period of time, it may be that whilst the delusions remained, the associated 
distress reduced.  Additional limitations of this study will be presented in 
further detail later in this discussion.  
 
Examination of distribution scores highlighted a further subset of participants 
who obtained scores of high anxiety and depression but felt that their 
persecutors held low power against them.  Arguably, this subset of 
participants could have been depressed and anxious, irrespective of their 
delusion. However, this is not supported by the fact that the BSER measure 
assessed emotions specifically related to delusions, and the same pattern 
was obtained as with the BDI and BAI. 
 
4.1.2.    Extension hypotheses. 
 
Bearing in mind Trower and Chadwick‟s (1995) theory of two types of 
paranoia, the extension hypotheses were that anger and shame would be 
linked to beliefs about deservedness of the threat.  Contrary to expectations, 
this study found no significant associations between deserved threat and 
either anger or shame. 
 
Participants did report the emotions of anger and shame.  However, similar 
to the BDI and BAI scores, the participants scored lower on shame and 
anger than might have been expected. It is possible that some of the factors 
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discussed above may also have affected these findings.  One such example 
may be the duration of illness. Participants, at the initial onset of their 
psychotic experience, may have felt high levels of anger and shame as 
reported by Miller and Mason (2005). However, after a period of time, as with 
depression and anxiety, it is possible that whilst the beliefs regarding the 
deservedness of threat remained, the associated anger and shame reduced. 
This could be one possible explanation for the results.  
 
Participants‟ status as in-patients or out-patients may have also affected the 
findings. It is possible, that for the majority of the participants (78% of the 
clinical sample), being an in-patient helped with the decreased levels of 
shame, anger and their ability to cope, as other patients with similar 
experiences to themselves were observed with differing levels of emotional 
responses and coping.  
 
A further possibility involves the methodology of the study. It is possible that 
the measures used for anger and shame (the scores from the BSER 
subscales), taken from a questionnaire which was not validated, may not 
have been adequate assessment of these emotions. This limitation will be 
discussed later in this section. 
 
The findings of this current study did support the sixth hypothesis as the 
ability to cope with threat beliefs was negatively correlated with depression. 
This is not surprising given the proliferation of work linking the ability to cope 
with depression in numerous general areas of study.  In addition, this 
association in part supports the argument of Ritsner et al. (2003), is 
highlighting the importance of coping with psychotic symptoms, to the levels 
of emotional distress and general quality of life.  The current study suggests 
that in considering individual symptoms such as persecutory delusions, the 
importance of ability to cope with also plays an important factor in emotional 
distress.  However, it could be argued that perhaps it is not the threat belief 
directly which causes emotional distress, but participants‟ secondary 
appraisal of coping with the threat belief that influences their levels of 
emotional distress. 
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4.1.3.    Details of threat beliefs 
Despite the failure to support five of the six research hypotheses, the current 
study did highlight some patterns with reference to details of persecutory 
delusions which were consistent with the results of the previous studies, 
exploring content and emotion directly.  For example, two of the main 
appraisals explored in this study, with regard to details of threat were similar 
to the study of Freeman et al. (2001).  Both studies found high levels of belief 
in the power of the persecutor. Sixty-two percent of the participants for this 
study rated high levels of belief in the power of the persecutor. This 
percentage is close to that of the Green et al. (2006) study (68%) and the 
Freeman et al. (2001) study (58%). The percentages for the deservedness of 
threat were also relatively close. Half (50) % of participants in the Freeman et 
al. (2001) felt that the threat was not deserved whilst more than half (67%) of 
the current study also felt that the threat was not deserved. This suggests 
that the current study was able to in part, replicate to some extent similar 
findings in terms of details of threat beliefs. 
 
4.2. Integrating findings of study to contemporary approaches to 
persecutory delusions 
  
4.2.1.   Definition of persecutory delusions 
The findings of this study appear to suggest that the criteria of Freeman and 
Garety (2000) as outlined in the introduction is applicable to this group. First, 
all participants of this study had the belief that harm is occurring or was to 
occur imminently. Secondly, all participants held the belief that their given 
persecutor had the intention to cause them harm. This is important, as the 
findings of this study could be said to provide further evidence and support 
for the criteria as a useful and meaningful starting point for the exploration of 
persecutory delusions. In addition, it could be said to support the 
conceptualisation of persecutory delusions as threat beliefs by Freeman and 
colleagues. 
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4.2.2.    Single symptom approach 
 
The adoption of the single symptom approach in this study did have 
advantages.   Detailed, fine grained study of threat beliefs and isolation of 
key variables such as the power of the persecutor was possible as a result of 
using this approach. However, the findings of this study also highlighted the 
possible disadvantages of using this approach to examine persecutory 
delusions and associated emotional distress. 
 
As stated in the introduction, one limitation of the single symptom approach 
is that it does not take into account the co-occurrence of symptoms, which 
was common in this study.  For instance, 24% percent of the sample of the 
current study reported voices with reference to their threat beliefs.  The co-
occurrence of symptoms was also found in the studies of Freeman et al. 
(2001) and Green et al.(2006) and other studies as reported in the 
introduction. One of the challenges lies in determining whether the group of 
participants in this study felt threatened because of what the voices say or 
their interpretation of the experience.  For example, considering participant 
24‟s threat belief;  
„Voices are telling me they will hurt people if I don‟t do what they 
want‟.  
 
It was impossible to ascertain whether the participant felt threatened 
because they believed they/their family would be hurt, or felt threatened by 
the entire experience.  There was also the presence of grandiose delusions 
in the clinical sample (24%).  With reference to this, this study could not 
control for the common co-occurrence of symptoms such as auditory 
hallucinations or delusions of grandeur.  The findings, indicating presence of 
other types of delusions, suggest perhaps persecutory delusions do not 
substantially set themselves apart from other types of delusions. In addition, 
it could be argued that persecutory delusions probably involve most of the 
same basic mechanisms as non-persecutory delusions. However, this 
possibility highlights one of the dangers of the single symptom approach as 
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stated in the introduction; that heterogeneity of symptoms leads to the 
assumption that underlying causes/processes are similar when they might 
not be.  It has been argued that the single-symptom approach may need to 
be broadened to account for the occurrence of multiple positive symptoms of 
psychosis (Freeman et al., 2001).  
 
4.2.3.   Cognitive approach 
As stated in the introduction, the central tenet in the cognitive approach to 
clinical phenomena is the idea that beliefs are linked to emotions.  
Contemporary approaches to persecutory delusions, in particular Freeman et 
al.‟s (2002), assert that particular emotions play a fundamental role in 
persecutory ideation development and maintenance.  However, if (as the 
findings of this current study suggests) content of threat beliefs are not 
associated with specific emotions, it could have two implications. It could 
mean that emotions do not play such a focal role in delusion formation and 
maintenance. Consequently, this could mean that the theories of persecutory 
delusions which emphasize emotions should be revised.   
  
4.2.4.    Contemporary models 
As described in the introduction of this thesis, Trower and Chadwick (1995) 
postulated a theory of persecutory delusions as a defence against 
depression and low self-esteem. This was extended further to make a 
distinction of two types of paranoia: „poor-me‟ and „bad- me‟.  With reference 
to this approach, this study found very few cases (5.4%) of „bad-me‟, 
paranoia. Additionally, mixed findings have been reported in previous studies 
regarding the possibility of two types of paranoia (Fornell – Ambrojo & 
Garety, 2005; Freeman et al., 2001).  It could be argued that perhaps these 
sub-types are not plausible as underlying trait psychological processes 
(Green et al., 2006).  
 
The multi-factorial model of persecutory delusions by Freeman et al. (2002) 
posits that delusions reflect the emotional state of the individual.  Emotional 
states of anxiety and depression, all have direct associations with 
persecutory threat beliefs, and are factors in causing the development and 
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maintenance of paranoia.  As described in the introduction, Freeman et al. 
(2002) place particular emphasis on the role of anxiety in terms of generating 
persecutory ideation. Anxiety helps lead the individual to search for a 
meaning and the selection of an explanation leading to a threat belief. This 
study, in particular in relation to research hypothesis 2, did not provide 
evidence to support this model. Anxiety was not found to have any significant 
correlations with content. Support for this model in general has been found in 
the studies of Freeman et al. (2001) and Green et al. (2003).  However, 
these studies did not provide evidence to illustrate any particular focal role 
for anxiety in terms of delusional belief.  
   
4.3.  Limitations 
Like all studies, this study has its limitations and given the present findings, it 
becomes more relevant to discuss these possible challenges. However, it is 
important to reiterate that this study is regarding only a very small part of the 
story of persecutory delusions and emotions, and does not provide an 
exhaustive account of the possible factors which could be implicated in the 
formation and maintenance of paranoid thinking. Similar to the study of 
Green et al. (2006), it does not attempt to establish any causal links between 
emotion, cognition and paranoia.  It is entirely possible that there are many 
pathways to emotional dysfunction with reference to persecutory beliefs that 
this study has not explored.  For example, studies examining „theory of mind‟ 
(Brune, 2005; Corcoran et al., 1995; 2003; 2008), and cognitive bias 
(McGhie & Chapman, 1961; Moritz & Woodward, 2004; 2006b), in relation to 
schizophrenia could also provide some insight into the role of emotions in 
persecutory delusions.   
  
4.3.1.     Study design 
One difficulty in the study design in general concerns the diagnostic 
heterogeneity of the sample. Most individuals had a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia.  However other individuals within the sample had diagnoses 
of schizo-affective disorder, schizoid personality disorder and unspecified 
psychosis.  This could be considered by those who adopt a diagnostic or 
syndrome approach a methodological flaw, thereby limiting conclusions that 
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can be drawn.  However, this study is based on the approach of Freeman et 
al. (2002), of persecutory delusions, which adopts a single symptom 
approach and conceptualises persecutory delusions as threat beliefs.  This 
study was interested in exploring cognitive and emotional correlates to these 
beliefs. Consequently, participants were selected on the criteria of having 
threat beliefs and not based on diagnosis.  It does logically follow that 
conclusions are made only in terms of what can be learnt about the „threat 
beliefs‟ and not what can be generalised about syndromes.   
 
4.3.2.     Measures 
It could be argued that there were not enough measures employed and they 
were not sophisticated enough to perhaps capture a significant effect. For 
example, the Novaco Anger Scale (Novaco, 1994) and Guilt Inventory 
(Kugler & Jones, 1992), could perhaps have been used in addition to the 
standardised emotion measures and BSER scale to explore the emotions 
associated with persecutory delusions.  However, given the clinical group 
under study, it would be highly unlikely that participants would be willing to 
participate fully or completely in long complex interviews with multitude of 
measures. 
 
It should be noted that a novel scale, the BSER, was used in this study, has 
not been previously validated, which could have affected findings. In 
addition, the general limitations of self-report measures should also be 
considered. Black and Wilson (1996) argued that many concepts are difficult 
to accurately assess using self-report measure. In addition, self-report 
measures have an underlying assumption that individuals can and will report 
their symptoms accurately (Derogatis & Meliseratos, 1983). This can be 
extended to questionnaire design methodology in general. Brown et al. 
(2009) notes that general criticisms of questionnaire-based research:  
„Share a concern about whether scores on putative cognitive 
measures have been shown conclusively to reflect variations in the 
underlying target phenomena or, indeed whether they actually 
measure cognition.‟ [p.942, Brown et al., 2009]   
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Specific to persecutory delusions, as stated in the introduction of this thesis, 
self report measures are particularly vulnerable to the problem of 
differentiating between realistic and unrealistic suspicions (Freeman et al., 
2008). The BSER scale as well as the Details of Threat questionnaire does 
not question the plausibility of the paranoid thought.  To consider an 
example, it is entirely possible that participant number 34 may be correct in 
some way in the assertion that the Dolling brothers are harming his family.  
Further assessment would be required with other possible measures to 
distinguish plausible from implausible thoughts. 
 
However, it can be argued that self report measures do have distinct 
advantages. It has been reported that self- report is a well validated method 
for assessing thoughts (De Vellis, 2003).  Derogatis and Meliseratos (1983) 
note that in gathering information directly from the individual experiencing the 
symptoms, exclusive information is provided that is unavailable through other 
methods.   In addition, self-report measures are quick and easy to 
administer, and are a useful way of eliciting a large amount of information 
(Morlan & Tan, 1998). 
 
In line with the argument noted by Brown et al. (2009), it could be questioned 
whether the BSER scale actually measures levels of emotional responses to 
threat beliefs.  It could be argued that there is the central underlying 
assumption (as with most measures) that the BSER scale is actually 
measuring what it claims to assess, and that there is little basis to assume 
that participants‟ scores reflects varying levels of emotions.  However, as 
reported in the results section of this thesis, the BSER subscales of sadness 
and anxiety were positively correlated with the BDI and the BAI.  This gave 
face validity to at least the two subscales of the BSER scale and gave some 
confidence that it could be used in addition to the standardised emotional 
disorder measures to confirm or refute the experimental hypotheses. 
Devising the BSER scale for the study that it is applied to is not without its 
flaws.  As a Likert scale, the scoring for this measure was arbitrary and the 
value assigned the items has no unique mathematical property. In order to 
provide the necessary details for this study, the scoring was determined by 
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the author of this thesis and the supervisory clinical psychologists.  
Consequently, it could be argued that the findings of this study could be in 
part due to researcher bias.  
 
  
4.3.3.    Recruitment of participants 
Given the intrinsic paranoia attached to this sample group, recruiting a 
representative sample of individuals with persecutory delusions was a 
challenge.  Obtaining informed consent from individuals with persecutory 
beliefs for research purposes is difficult. Twenty-five participants approached 
refused to participate in the current study, as reported in the methods section 
of this thesis.  Many of the individuals who refused to participate in this study 
were reported by the mental health professional of the various clinical 
settings to be the most suspicious and paranoid. It could be argued that the  
recruitment may have introduced selection biases, particularly by recruiting 
only those who were willing and well enough to participate.  
 
4.4.   Contribution to knowledge represented by the study 
  
Despite the limitations, and the findings which did not support the research 
hypotheses, this small exploratory study has made a modest contribution to 
our understanding of the general area of persecutory delusions.   
 
First, it has provided further additional information in relation to the content of 
persecutory delusions, an area, as stated in the introduction, that has not 
been widely researched. For example, the information with reference to the 
power of the persecutor (most participants rating the power of the persecutor 
highly) suggests maybe this variable should be examined further. 
Secondly, this study suggests that there are gaps in our understanding and 
examination of persecutory delusions.  The cognitive model of Freeman et al. 
(2002), presents a multifactorial account of the development of persecutory 
delusions, which hypothesizes specific relationships between emotion, 
cognitive biases and anomalous experiences. It could be argued that this 
study, in not supporting the hypotheses, highlights that more research is 
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required to explore and unpack all the possible variables which could be 
implicated in the development of persecutory delusions. 
 
The presence of the co-occurrence of symptoms in this study as stated 
earlier, questions the extent to which persecutory symptoms can be explored 
in isolation.  A third argument for this study‟s contribution is that it provides 
evidence and adds to the general theoretical debate regarding the limitations 
and utility of the single symptom approach. It can be argued that the 
limitations of this approach in the theoretical inability to explore the influence 
of various symptoms halts any further advancement of knowledge to this 
area in a particular direction. 
 
In terms of research methodology, this study demonstrates that a multi-
dimensional approach perhaps ought to be increasingly considered with 
more sophisticated and current measures.  
 
In addition to contributing to knowledge, it could also be argued that this 
study has contributed to assessment procedures by developing a novel 
measure, for this particular area of study. Although still in development, it 
shows promise by capturing similar data to standardised measures.  It has 
been shown to have good reliability and internal consistency. It could be for 
routine clinical assessment, with further development and exploration of this 
measure with larger groups to assess its validity.   
 
Finally, it can be argued that indirectly, this study also questions the 
limitations of the single symptom and cognitive approach to emotional 
distress. In attempting to explain the failure to support the research 
hypotheses, it could be said to perhaps give evidence for further debate 
regarding alternative approaches to explore the paranoid experience such as 
the social constructionist approach (Harper 2004; Cromby & Harper, 2005), a 
grounded theory construction (Boyd & Gumley, 2007) or the recovery model 
(Mahler, Tavano, Gerard & Baber, 2001; Anthony, 1993; Deegan, 1988).  
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4.5. Implications 
The findings of this current research study may have potential research and 
clinical implications.  
 
The study‟s failure to support the hypotheses may mean that further thought 
and study is required with regards to the cognitive approach to persecutory 
delusions. It could mean that the cognitive approach does not provide a full 
enough understanding of the psychotic experience, and as stated earlier, 
alternative explanations need to be considered. 
  
Within the assessment stage, perhaps using measures such as the Detail of 
Threat Questionnaire could help to obtain  further details of areas other than  
those explored in this study, such as power of the persecutor, deservedness 
of threat, control and coping with the existence of the threat, which were 
found to be highly salient for the participants in this study.    
 
There has been increased agreement that psychological therapy should be 
informed by considering the interplay between emotion and psychosis 
(Birchwood & Trower, 2006; Birchwood 2003).  In current interventions, such 
as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), symptoms of emotional 
disturbance are emphasized as important aspects of the subjective 
experience in psychosis, as well as the symptoms that define psychosis itself 
(Fowler, Garety & Kuipers; 1995). Reducing the emotional distress 
associated with psychotic symptoms as well as challenging delusions are 
aims of therapy for psychosis. From the findings of this study, it is apparent 
that negative emotions are found in participants with persecutory beliefs, 
confirming that they need to be considered as targets for interventions.   
 
Beliefs in regards to the power of the voice have been related to voice 
distress by Birchwood et al. (2000); Chadwick and Birchwood, (1995a; 
1995b) and Gilbert et al. (2001). It is argued that addressing such beliefs is 
critical to the success of approaches such as CBT in reducing voice distress. 
Evidence for this has been found in a randomised controlled trial where CBT 
targeted command hallucinations. Results indicated a reduction in conviction 
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in beliefs about the power and superiority of the voices, depression and 
distress and compliance with the voice‟s commands (Trower et al., 2004). 
This study also found evidence of participants believing that their persecutors 
were powerful but not an association with emotion. However, exploring the 
beliefs of powerlessness in comparison to the persecutor and others in 
general, may lead to a reduction in the belief of the extent of the power of the 
persecutor. 
 
4.6.  Recommendations for future research 
The limitations of this study should be addressed in future research.  
Longitudinal studies with larger samples than this study, could help 
disentangle possible interactions between persecutory delusions and other 
symptoms such as auditory hallucinations. There is also the impact of culture 
on content which could be explored in future studies. The study of Suhail and 
Cochrane (2002) found phenomenological differences of delusions and 
hallucinations in Pakistani patients living in Pakistan, Pakistani patients living 
in Britain and British White patients. Associations have also been noted 
between the content of life events or traumatic experiences and the content 
of psychotic experiences (Hardy et al., 2005; Raune et al., 2006). A 
longitudinal study could help establish further the potential contribution of 
such factors to delusional content. In addition to this, they could help explore 
the hypothesis by Freeman and Garety (2003) that emotions and delusions 
share common mechanisms. 
 
The co-occurrence of symptoms such as auditory and grandiose 
hallucinations with persecutory delusions, suggests possible potential 
theoretical links with models such as the cognitive model for hallucinations 
(Beck & Rector, 2003), which could be examined in the future. For example, 
one area of study would be to explore whether persecutory delusions 
develop for the most part to explain unusual experiences. 
 
Alternative appraisals in relation to content of persecutory delusions and 
emotional distress might also be important to consider. For example, the 
study of Watson et al. (2006) considered the perception of illness as an 
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appraisal for individuals who experience psychosis. It was found that 
negative illness perceptions in psychosis clearly related to depression, 
anxiety and self esteem. Using the single symptom approach, it would very 
interesting to consider this appraisal in relation to the content of persecutory 
delusions.  For example, it would be interesting to explore whether a 
negative or positive perception of illness in persecutory ideation affect the 
power of the persecutor for the given individual. 
 
The BSER Scale was able to illustrate the range of possible emotions in 
persecutory delusions in this study. This measure could potentially be 
particularly useful in guiding later interventions even in the absence of 
conclusive findings for this current study. The BSER scale could be 
administered initially to measure a wide range of emotions (including 
depression and anxiety) in one measure, and perhaps to ascertain which 
emotion is most prominently associated with the content of persecutory 
delusions. Once identified, measures which assess specifics of a given 
emotion, such as the BDI for depression, could be administered.  With further 
testing, its use may also be extended in relation to phenomena other than 
persecutory delusions. 
 
 
4.7. Final reflections 
In concluding this thesis, I would like to highlight the fact that conducting this 
research reminded me of the importance of the role of the clinical 
psychologist as an active researcher helping to improve our understanding of 
mental distress and inform clinical practice and wider society.  This study 
continued to remind me of how truly distressing the content and associated 
emotions of persecutory delusions can be for individuals. Conducting this 
research has only further heightened my enthusiasm and interest for this 
particular area of mental health and reaffirmed my career decision, ultimately 
to work with individuals who experience psychotic symptoms. The novel 
BSER measure is in the early development stages.  It is hoped that it will be 
a useful assessment tool for clinical services, with further assessment of its 
validity. 
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This study is a starting point in attempting to unpack particular factors which 
may contribute to the paranoid experience, in particular possible associations 
between content and emotions. It is a small exploratory study.  However, it 
can be argued that it opens up the field for more detailed, sophisticated 
funded research. 
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Stratford Campus 
Water Lane 
London E15 4LZ 
 
Study Title: Cognitive and emotional processes in persecutory 
delusions 
REC reference number: 09/H0713/51 
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Thank you for your letter of 01 October 2009, responding to the Committee‟s 
request for further information on the above research and submitting revised 
documentation. 
 
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the 
Chair. 
 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical 
opinion for the above research on the basis described in the application form, 
protocol and supporting documentation as revised, subject to the conditions 
specified below. 
 
Ethical review of research sites 
 
The favourable opinion applies to all NHS sites taking part in the study, 
subject to management permission being obtained from the NHS/HSC R&D 
office prior to the start of the study (see “Conditions of the favourable 
opinion” below). 
 
Conditions of the favourable opinion 
 
 
The favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior 
to the start of the study. 
 
Management permission or approval must be obtained from each host 
organisation prior to the start of the study at the site concerned. 
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For NHS research sites only, management permission for research (“R&D 
approval”) should be obtained from the relevant care organisation(s) in accordance 
with NHS research governance arrangements.  Guidance on applying for NHS 
permission for research is available in the Integrated Research Application System 
or at http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk.  Where the only involvement of the NHS 
organisation is as a Participant Identification Centre, management permission for 
research is not required but the R&D office should be notified of the study. 
Guidance should be sought from the R&D office where necessary. 
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Statement of compliance 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance 
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fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics 
Committees in the UK. 
 
After ethical review 
 
Now that you have completed the application process please visit the 
National Research Ethics Service website > After Review 
 
You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from 
the National Research Ethics Service and the application procedure.  If you 
wish to make your views known please use the feedback form available on 
the website. 
 
The attached document “After ethical review – guidance for researchers” 
gives detailed guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a 
favourable opinion, including: 
 
 Notifying substantial amendments 
 Adding new sites and investigators 
 Progress and safety reports 
 Notifying the end of the study 
 
The NRES website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated 
in the light of changes in reporting requirements or procedures. 
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Appendix H. Belief Specific Emotional Response Scale 
 
Belief Specific Emotional Response Scale 
Some or all of these words may describe the way you feel when you think 
about whom or what is threatening you. Please read the following words 
carefully and indicate with a tick the words which bet describe the way you 
feel. 
 
This threat makes me feel…. 
 
 
                                   Not at all        a little               somewhat             quite a lot        
very much 
 Angry      
 Annoyed      
 Irritated      
 Furious      
 Outraged      
 
 
                                   Not at all        a little               somewhat             quite a lot        
very much 
 
 Miserable      
 Depressed      
 Hopeless      
 Despair      
 Gloomy      
 
                                   Not at all        a little               somewhat             quite a lot         
very much 
 
 Anxious      
 Frightened      
 Worried      
 Nervous      
 Terrified      
 
 
                                  Not at all        a   little               somewhat             quite a lot        
very much 
   
 
   
 
Guilty      
Regretful      
Remorseful      
Wicked      
Blameworthy      
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                                   Not at all        a   little               somewhat             quite a lot        
very much 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank You For Your Co-operation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ashamed      
Ridiculed      
Humiliated      
Mocked      
Embarrassed      
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Appendix I: Consent form for Responsible Medical Officer 
 
Dear…… 
 
Re: Study investigating cognitive and emotional processes in 
persecutory delusions. 
Researcher: Anneline Flood, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of East 
London. 
Supervisors:    Ken Gannon, Research Director, University of East London. 
Dr Emmanuelle Peters, Institute of Psychiatry 
   Dr Daniel Freeman, Institute of Psychiatry 
   
Persecutory delusions have been argued to be the most frequently occurring 
delusions (Cutting, 1997), most likely to be acted upon (Wessely et al, 1993) 
and are a predictor of admission to hospital (Castle et al, 1994).  It has also 
been argued that associations between emotion and the content of 
delusional beliefs may contribute to the maintenance of delusions 
(Birchwood, 2003; Freeman and Garety, 2003). 
I am conducting a study considering the possible direct associations between  
specific emotions and threat beliefs (in terms of content and further 
appraisals) in persecutory delusions. 
The study takes the form of a clinical interview consisting  
of five questionnaires; 
 
Details of Threat Questionnaire (Freeman et al, 2001) 
Beck‟s Depression Inventor (BDI)  (Beck et al. 1979) 
Beck‟s Anxiety Inventory (BAI)   (Beck et al. 1988) 
Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (Watson and Friend, 1969) 
 
The interview will take approximately one hou. It is voluntary participation 
and the patients can terminate the interview at any time once started. 
Identifying specific relationships between types of threat beliefs, appraisals 
and emotional responses will lead to better formulations and guide 
interventions to be used by staff and specialists within the NHS. The study is 
particularly relevant to further refining treatments such as Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy as recommended by the NICE guidelines as therapists  
 
 
could focus on the possible links between the emotional state of the clients 
and the content of their beliefs in reducing distress. 
I would very much like your permission to interview any suitable patients in 
your care.  Please complete the consent form below and return the slip in the 
envelope provided. 
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I …………………………………………………*give consent/do not give 
consent for patients in my care (please list names below) to participate in this 
study. 
 
Names of patients to be approached for consideration of this study. 
 
……………………………………………………. 
 
………………………….. ………………………..  
                
 
*please delete as appropriate. 
 
Date:……………………………………….. 
 
Should you require any further information in regards to this project please 
do not hesitate to contact me 062245@UEL-Exchange.uel.ac.uk. 
Thank you, 
Yours sincerely, 
Anneline Flood, Trainee Clinical Psychologist. 
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Appendix J: Information sheet for potential participants 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
My name is Anneline and I would like to invite you to take part in my 
research study.  Before you decide, I would like you to understand why the 
research is being done and what it would involve for you. 
          
 PART ONE 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
I am carrying out a study looking at the different ways people feel they are in 
danger and how this makes them feel. People who feel they are in danger 
may feel anxious, depressed, angry, guilty or ashamed. This study may help 
to show some clear links between the danger and these feelings.  
 
Why have I been invited? 
Your care co-ordinator thought that you might be interested in taking part in 
this study as you may sometimes feel that you are in danger. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. I will describe the study and go 
through this information sheet.  If you agree to take part, I will then ask you to 
sign a consent form. You are within your rights to withdraw at any time 
without giving a reason.  This will not affect the standard of care you receive. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
Before the interview, I will speak with you about any concerns you may have 
about the study. You will be asked to complete seven short questionnaires I 
will be available if you need to ask any questions about the questionnaires. 
The questionnaires will ask you about the danger you experience and how 
this makes you feel.   
 
The interview will not last longer than an hour. It will take place in a private 
area.  After the interview is completed, I will speak with you again to discuss 
any concerns you have about the questions asked. 
 
As a re-imbursement for your time, you will receive a £10.00 voucher. 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 before making 
any decision. 
     
PART TWO 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part in this study? 
There is a very small possibility that speaking about feeling in danger may 
make you uncomfortable.  Should this occur, the interview will be stopped 
immediately.  You will have the opportunity to speak to myself or someone 
else if you prefer about your discomfort. 
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What are the possible benefits of taking part in this study? 
I cannot promise the study will help you directly but the information I get from 
this study will help understand people who will feel the same when they feel 
they are in danger. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the interview? 
You are within your rights to withdraw at any point during the interview 
without explanation.  This will not affect your care. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to 
speak to the researcher who will do their best to answer your question.  If 
you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this by 
contacting  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected about you during this study will be kept 
strictly confidential. Your name and personal details will be completely 
anonymous. 
 
What will happen to my completed questionnaires? 
Your completed questionnaires will be held with questionnaires completed by 
other participants secure in a locked cabinet within my university until we 
study the answers. My supervisors and I will have sole access to your 
completed questionnaires. Once I have studied the answers, the 
questionnaires will be shredded. 
The results of the study will be published and you will access to this 
information.  You will not be identified in any publications. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The University of East London is the sponsor of this study. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people 
called a Research Ethics Committee to protect your interests.  This study has 
been reviewed and given a favourable opinion by the Great Ormond Street 
Hospital/Institute of Child Health Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Further information and contact details 
I will contact you within 48hrs once you have read this information to find out 
whether you are interested in participating in the study.  Should you want to 
speak to me before then you can email me on 
U0622453@UEL-Exchange.uel.ac.uk. 
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APPENDIX  K:  Consent form for participants 
 
CONSENT FORM 
Study Number 
Client Identification Number 
Title of Project 
 
  Name of Researcher 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet                       
      dated for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider  
 the information, ask questions and have had these answered      
       satisfactorily.         
           
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my careor legal 
rights being affected. 
  
3. I understand that relevant sections of the data collected during                 
                the study may be looked at by individuals from the NHS Trust, where 
                 it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission 
                for these individuals to have access to my records. 
 
4. I agree to take part in the study.                      
 
 
----------------------    ------------------  ---------------------------- 
Name of patient               Date     Signature 
 
-----------------------    -----------------------  ------------------------------
- 
Name of person   Date    Signature 
taking consent 
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Appendix L: Bar charts of skewered data 
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Appendix M.  Summary of the participants’ persecutory beliefs                    
   
_____________________________________________________________
_  
No.    Belief 
_____________________________________________________________
_ 
1. People are watching me, always saying things about me 
2. Under surveillance and interfering with family and social relationships 
3. Ward staff are trying to strangle me on … ward
1
 
4. Sometimes I feel that I will be physically harmed 
5. My ex partner is following me.  Walking down the road, people will harm me 
6. Voices are talking about me, cussing me constantly 
7. I feel threatened by people physically in general 
8. People have future technology that can read my mind. 
9. I am being constantly harassed verbally by the kids on the estate 
10. The mental health system and the OT is trying to get me 
11. I hear bird noises which puts pressure on my eyes; they are flying and torturing me. 
12.  I will be killed and resurrected 1000 times for my crimes as a Nazi soldier, blow for 
blow, life for life 
13.  Voices are telling me to commit suicide, trying to drive me to commit suicide. voices 
are  messing with my mind. 
14. Germans, Ankas, Ugandans are taking over Europe.  They will kill me off 
15.  Belinda, Andrew, Okwai are raping me all the time. The heroin in my cigarettes are 
sending me mad 
16. Voices in my head are telling me to kill myself and my mother 
17. There‟s poison in the water, in the milk, they are trying to kill me 
18. Holly is threatening me, stalking me  
19. Voices keep coming up in my throat and are trying to choke me 
20. Voices are getting to me.  They are very critical 
21. I‟m haunted by people who have attacked me in the past 
22. Nine voices are bothering me when I watch TV or listen to the radio. 
23. One person wants to kill me to benefit another on this ward 
24. Voices are telling me that they will hurt people if I don‟t do what they want 
25. God is punishing me by trying to throw me into a well 
26. Millie is trying to get me to kill myself, trying to make me think ugly thoughts 
27. The voices say if I don‟t do things, I‟ll get shot.  Something will happen to my kids if I 
don‟t do as they say 
28. ET keeps winding me up 
29. The voices tell me to do stuff, they take over my thoughts. 
30. I feel that everyone is raping me, the nurses; they are out to get me 
31. People are trying to kill me, to poison me, to take over my body 
32. They are taking my babies away, keeping me in hospital 
33. People are penetrating my mind, trying to harm me 
34. The Dolling brothers are harming my family, getting in at night and drugging them 
35. The system is trying to harm me, trying to control my mind so that I can become a 
father and abide by their rules 
36. People are using me as a donor, taking my organs without my permission 
37. Aliens at night come to my room to take me away to other planets. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Specific name of ward identified by participant has been removed. 
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Appendix N   Details of Content for clinical sample 
 
 
 
Details of threat beliefs  
 
Participants’ responses (%) 
N=37 
 
Harm Occurring 
 
    Yes                      100% 
     No                        0% 
 Pervasiveness of threat    
    On ward                      62.1% 
    Outside of ward                      13.5% 
     Inside of home                       5.4% 
     Anywhere                      18.9% 
Time Scale  
     Happening                       40.5% 
     0-7days                      35.1% 
     A week to six months                      18.9% 
Certainty of harm (100%)                      69% 
 Identity of persecutor known?  
      yes                     81.0% 
      no                     18.9% 
High power of persecutor                      62% 
Do not deserve threat (rating zero)                      67.6% 
Deserve threat  (rating zero)                      5.4% 
Awfulness of threat (maximum score)                      54% 
Unfairness of threat  
     Extremely unfair                      37.8% 
      Not at all unfair                     21.6% 
Coping with threat (rating three and 
below for not coping at all) 
                    44.9% 
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Appendix O:    Comparing details of studies directly relevant to study 
 
  Current Study 
 
Green et al. 
(2006) 
Freeman et al. 
(2001) 
  N   37  70  25 
 Male   17 50 16 
Female   20 20 9 
In-patient   78.4% 64.3% 60% 
Out-patient   21.6% 35.7% 40% 
 
Details of Content 
% 
     
High power of the 
persecutor 
62 68 58 
Low deservedness 
of threat. 
67 - 48 
„Poor –me‟ 67.6 50 - 
„Bad-me‟ 5.4 8.1 - 
Inability to cope 45.9 - - 
 Conspiracy 13.5 81.7 28 
 
Emotion scores 
(mean) 
   
BDI 14.7 (S.D. =8.5)  25.0 (S.D.=13.5) 23.2 (S.D. 12.9) 
BAI 16.0 (S.D. =10.5)  22.9 (S.D. 13.4) 23.5 (S.D.=13.8) 
 
Other Delusions% 
   
Auditory 24 92.6 40 
Grandiose 24 32.4 20 
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